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This thesis examines, using the framework of a cost-loss ratio, the dilemma
of the Navy decision maker faced with the question of whether or not to sortie
ocean-going ships from a port threatened by a hurricane. The long leadtime
needed to execute a full sortie requires the decision maker to rely on hurricane
forecasts that may contain large errors, despite improvements in forecasting over
the past two decades. Furthermore, decision makers may have difficulty
interpreting forecasts without the use of a decision aid. Analysis includes
interviews with several tropical cyclone experts, a literature review of the
economics of hurricanes, and a critique of a number of hurricane decision aids.
Based upon this research, this thesis concludes that the CHARM model for setting
hurricane readiness conditions is currently the best decision aid available for
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This thesis examines the dilemma of the Navy decision maker who
must decide whether or not to sortie ocean-going ships from a port
threatened by a hurricane. In his analysis, the decision maker must weigh
the large errors in the tropical cyclone forecast. Sortie preparations may be
initiated as early as three days in advance of the hurricane's expected
landfall; the average 72-hour track forecast error is 309 n mi. Because
tropical cyclone forecast accuracy improves as the forecast period decreases,
the decision maker may be tempted to put off the sortie decision until more
reliable forecasts are available. There is a tradeoff for delaying. If the
decision maker waits too long, the rapidly deteriorating weather conditions
may prevent a safe departure from the port.
Using the tools of decision analysis, the hurricane sortie problem is
modeled as a "game against nature" in which the probability of experiencing
destructive winds is compared to the cost of protection divided by the cost
of damages incurred when protective measures are not taken. This cost-loss
ratio is the critical value above which protection is the optimal course of
action and below which it is not. Based on the relative costs, the decision
maker should be willing to accept a certain number of unnecessary sorties
in order to avoid catastrophic loss. Past attempts to approximate this cost-
loss ratio for hurricanes are reviewed. These studies show that, although
the cost-loss ratio is a useful criterion for hurricane sortie decisions, huge
XI
variations in the costs associated with hurricane preparations and avoidable
damages make the ratio a difficult quantity to estimate directly.
Forecasts used in conjunction with hurricane haven studies provide the
decision maker with the raw data needed to make a threat assessment.
Nonetheless, he may have difficulty interpreting and integrating all of the
information without the assistance of a decision aid. This thesis evaluates
how well the existing tropical cyclone decision aids meet the needs of the
Navy decision maker facing a hurricane sortie decision. The wind
probability forecast is an especially useful tool in that it simultaneously
accounts for errors in all aspects of the hurricane: track, translational
speed, maximum wind speed and size. There are a number of excellent
software packages, such as Automated Tropical Cyclone Forecaster Junior
(ATCFjr), Cyclone/Hurricane Acceptable Risk Model (CHARM) and
Enhanced GDS, that can help the decision maker visualize and assess the
threat to his operations.
The wind probability-based CHARM nomograph for setting hurricane
readiness conditions is singled out as the best decision aid available for
reducing the number of unnecessary sorties without putting the fleet at
significantly increased risk. This model relies on the CHARM concept which
proposes that there is some destructive wind level for which preparations
must be made and some lower wind level which prohibits most preparations.
A CHARM nomograph for a particular location is derived by comparing a
Xll
large number of computer-simulated forecasts for hurricanes that passed
near the point of interest to hindsight estimates of the actual wind
conditions that were experienced. A user-selected confidence level for
correctly setting a given readiness condition indirectly estimates the cost-
loss ratio threshold values that separate the readiness conditions. This study
recommends that CHARM nomographs be developed for harbors used by
the U.S. Navy fleet.
Finally, this thesis considers the accuracy of Atlantic tropical cyclone
forecasts. The National Hurricane Center official track forecast errors have
been steadily decreasing over the past twenty years. Updating the strike
and wind probability software to reflect these improvements could lead to





Hurricanes cost the U.S. Navy, on the average, hundreds of thousands
of dollars each year in protection costs (e.g., costs to secure the base, sortie
ships, evacuate aircraft). The Atlantic and Gulf Coasts are threatened by an
average often tropical cyclones 1 per year (Brand and Blelloch, 1974, p. 353),
affecting more than 12 U.S. Navy ports.2 The average annual cost per
military base for hurricane preparedness actions, excluding the costs of
unnecessary evasive actions by ships, is estimated as $704,344 in 1993
dollars (National Hurricane Center unpublished cost study, 1993). The
Naval Atlantic Meteorology and Oceanography Center
(NAVLANTMETOCCEN), Norfolk estimated the cost to sortie 15 ships and
eight submarines as $690,000 in 1993 dollars. (NAVLANTMETOCCEN
Norfolk "Hurricane Emily Sortie" brief, 1994)
'A tropical cyclone is a nonfrontal low-pressure system of synoptic scale developing over
tropical or subtropical waters and having a definite organized circulation. A tropical
depression is a tropical cyclone in which the maximum sustained surface wind is <, 33
knots. A tropical storm is a warm-core tropical cyclone in which the maximum sustained
surface wind is between 34 and 63 knots. A warm-core tropical cyclone in which the
maximum sustained surface wind is £ 64 knots is called a hurricane in the North Atlantic
and eastern North Pacific and a typhoon in the western North Pacific. (Kotsch and
Henderson, 1984, p. 15)
2There are 12 U.S. Navy installations in the western North Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico
which are serviced by U.S. Navy Strike and Wind Probability Forecasts. The Hurricane
Havens Handbook for the North Atlantic Ocean covers these 12 plus 10 additional harbors
which may be used by Navy ships. (Turpin and Brand, 1982, p. 1-15)
1. The Decision
When faced with the question of whether or not to sortie ocean-going
ships from ports threatened by a hurricane, the decision maker must weigh
the large errors in the tropical cyclone forecast and assess the relative risks
of remaining in port or putting to sea. Each "leave/stay" decision depends
on the circumstances of the threat, the operational environment, the
characteristics of the port and the capabilities of the vessel. (Turpin and
Brand, 1982, 1-1)
Unfortunately, ships must initiate preparations for a hurricane sortie
well before any hurricane watches are issued; likewise, hurricane warnings
come too late to help with the actual order to sortie.3 Despite the fact that
forecast errors increase as the forecast period lengthens (Neumann and
Pelissier, 1981
,
p. 1264), Navy decision makers are strongly urged to resolve
the leave/stay dilemma at an early stage in the threat situation (Commander
3A hurricane watch is a preliminary alert that a hurricane may threaten a specified
portion of the coast. A watch typically is issued 36 hours before landfall could occur. A
hurricane warning indicates that hurricane conditions are expected within 24 hours along
a specified portion of the coast. (Turpin and Brand, 1982, 1-12) During the 1970s,
hurricane warnings were issued, on the average, 19 hours prior to landfall. According to
Neumann and Pelissier (1981),
...the time of issuance of hurricane warnings represents a
compromise between an effort to minimize the area of overwarning and an
attempt to provide enough lead time in which to complete precautionary
actions....Experience has shown that, in most cases, an effective compromise
is achieved if warnings are issued about 18 hours before landfall, 12 hours
of which occur during daylight.(Neumann and Pelissier, 1981, pp. 1264-
1265).
The area damaged by a hurricane typically encompasses one-third of the warned area,
therefore approximately two-thirds of the area protects unnecessarily and is, in effect,
"overwamed" (American Meteorological Society, 1993, p. 1377).
in Chief U.S. Atlantic Fleet Letter, 13 April 1982). The tradeoff for delaying
the decision until more accurate forecasts are available is the possible
elimination of the sortie as a viable option due to the rapidly deteriorating
weather conditions. Consequently, there exists an optimal decision point
where the marginal benefit of improved forecast accuracy equals the
marginal cost of decreased safety.
In his analysis, the decision maker should also balance the cost of
protection against the cost of avoidable damages. In the past, it has been
assumed that if one sorties unnecessarily nine out of ten times, it will still
be cost effective (Interview between Charlie Mauck, Fleet Numerical
Meteorology and Oceanography Center, Monterey and the author, 13 May
1994). This implies a ratio of costs to losses of 10%. However, it is difficult
to come up with one ratio that accounts for all ships and all hurricanes (see
Chapter IE). Damage and preparation costs can vary greatly; when
astronomical losses occur, this ratio approaches zero. For example, the USS
Regulus ran aground in the Hong Kong harbor after the passage of Typhoon
Rose in August 1971, costing the U.S. Navy approximately $8-10 million in
1971 dollars (Brand and Blelloch, 1974, p. 354).4 Using the cost estimates
from Brand and Blelloch (1971) for fuel, pilot and tug fees, boat
transportation, "lighting off' the boilers, and overtime for the civilian charter
'Pacific typhoons are typically larger and stronger than Atlantic hurricanes and
therefore cause more damage.
crew, the cost for a two-day sortie for a chartered cargo ship can be
estimated as $20,000 in 1971 dollars. Taking the cost of damage as $10
million, the resulting cost-loss ratio is .002. This means that it is worthwhile
to sortie 500 times unnecessarily to avoid the damage caused by one mishap
of the magnitude suffered by the USS Regulus!
Another issue that will affect the hurricane sortie decision is the
decision maker's attitude toward risk. Given the extremely high costs
incurred if protective measures are not taken and the hurricane hits, there
is a natural inclination to choose a conservative course of action. Protection
costs are certainly less visible than the losses suffered if ships "get beat up
pierside." (Telephone conversation between CDR Lilly,
NAVLANTMETOCCEN Norfolk and the author, 9 May 1994) Few Naval
officers can afford to make career-impacting mistakes like that, regardless
of how well-informed the decision. Chapters II and V discuss further the
concept of risk.
The sortie decision will also depend on how the decision maker
interprets the forecasts. At the time that the decision maker must make the
call, the probabilities may still be quite low. However, it is not uncommon
for a decision maker to automatically assume that the hurricane is heading
straight for his area of responsibility and thus perceive the probability of
being "hit" as being much larger than it is. This phenomenon is known as
the base effect. Conversely, the decision maker may be reluctant to order
a sortie based on such a low probability. Because "major hurricanes are
infrequent events for any given location," (Sheets, 1990, p. 189) the decision
maker may have never experienced the full force of a major hurricane and
consequently may underestimate the seriousness of the threat.
2. The Decision Makers
Responsibility for tropical cyclone forecasting and for issuing
hurricane watches and warnings in the North Atlantic and the eastern North
Pacific rests with the National Hurricane Center (NHQ, one of three
national centers operated by the National Weather Service (NWS). The
NHC also conducts a post-storm analysis to determine the best estimate of
the actual track of a storm. (Sheets, 1990, p. 186)
For the U.S. Navy, the Base Commander is responsible for setting
hurricane conditions of readiness5 , opening and manning shelters and
securing base personnel. The Senior Officer Present Afloat is responsible
for sortie decisions. (COMNAVBASENORVA/SOPA(ADMIN)HAMPINST
3141. IS, 18 May 1993, p.4) The NAVLANTMETOCCEN Norfolk makes
sortie recommendations and recommendations regarding setting readiness
conditions; it also issues Navy tropical cyclone warnings that essentially
5Hurricane conditions of readiness are defined as follows:
Condition IV: hurricane force winds (£ 64 kts) are possible within 72 hours.
Condition III: hurricane force winds (£ 64 kts) are possible within 48 hours.
Condition II: hurricane force winds (£ 64 kts) are anticipated within 24 hours.
Condition I: hurricane force winds (£ 64 kts) are anticipated within 12 hours.
reproduce the NHC warnings (Telephone conversation between CDR Lilly,
Operations Officer, NAVLANTMETOCCEN, Norfolk and the author, 9 May
1994).
B. IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY
In the past, the U.S. Navy has sent its decision makers mixed
messages about hurricane decision aids. For example, the Navy contracted
the development of a decision model for setting hurricane readiness
conditions (the Cyclone/Hurricane Acceptable Risk Model), but omitted its
inclusion in official policy documents such as the Hurricane Havens
Handbook for the North Atlantic Ocean (Turpin and Brand, 1982). These
inconsistencies may be attributed to the confusion of decision aiding with
decision making, and the perception of the models as unreliable. Some
people have a basic mistrust of rational, prescriptive models, perhaps fearing
that the rational model will be followed blindly and without consideration
of its limitations. The Hurricane Havens Handbook for the North Atlantic
Ocean amplifies on this idea:
Objective methods for setting Hurricane Conditions on
the basis of the forecast "open ocean" winds would have
supported many unnecessary sorties as a result of ignoring the
effects of increased friction on the surface wind field....The
penalty for abandoning a well-rounded evaluation of each
hurricane threat in favor of a purely "objective" approach based
upon certain probabilities of strike and 50-kt winds will be a
large increase in unnecessary sorties. Instead, a current
tropical cyclone threat should be monitored with the best
objective aids available, but also with a keen awareness of the
character of the "worst case" threat and the likely impact of
lesser threats."6 (Turpin and Brand, 1982, 1-5)
Slovic (1984), on the other hand, levies a strong argument in favor of the
rational model:
In the face of uncertainty, man may be an intellectual
cripple whose intuitive judgements and decisions violate many
of the fundamental principles of optimal behaviour. These
intellectual deficiencies underscore the need for decision-aiding
techniques. (Singleton and Hovden, p. 151, italics added)
H
According to Baird (1989), 'The era of the successful intuitive decision
maker is over." (Baird, 1989, p. xi)
Despite the U.S. Navy's cautiousness about using objective methods
for assessing hurricane threats, it continues to fund the development of
tropical cyclone decision aids. A CINCPACFLT requirement states as its
objectives:
Develop forecasting decision aids for tropical cyclones
and assess forecast content. Evaluate the reality of the 135 nm
statistical error buffer added to the 30 kt wind forecast zone;
identify applicable, newly-developed algorithms and decision
aids such as the charm [sic] model decision criteria; identify, if
necessary, new decision aid algorithms which will assist
commanding officers to determine optimum operational tactics
and acceptable levels of risk for both personnel and material
when under the threat of heavy weather.
(COMNAVOCEANCOM PAC MET 87-07, 1991)
6Actually, Brand was an advocate ofaddingjust such a probability-based decision model
to each port evaluation. (Interview between Sam Brand, Naval Research Laboratory
Monterey and the author, 6 May 1994)
The apparent mistrust of rational models is fueled, in this case, by the
inadequacies of the existing decision aids and the errors in the model inputs,
the tropical cyclone forecasts. The following case study highlights the need
for improved hurricane decision aids and forecasts. In 1993, Norfolk Naval
activities were threatened by Hurricane Emily. The decision was made to
conduct a partial sortie despite a recommendation to the contrary from the
NAVLANTMETOCCEN Norfolk.7 After Hurricane Emily recurved to the
north, missing Norfolk, the NAVLANTMETOCCEN Norfolk performed a
cost analysis which was briefed at the 1994 Interdepartmental Hurricane
Conference. The results of the cost analysis are given in Chapter III. The
purpose of the brief was to emphasize the special requirements of Naval
stations as customers of the National Hurricane Center's forecasting and
advisory services. The NAVLANTMETOCCEN Norfolk expressed a desire
for significantly improved forecast accuracy out to 72 hours (specifically, a
two-thirds reduction in forecast error), forecasts extended out to 96 hours
in order to have sufficient lead time to sortie the ships in port, and improved
basin-specific storm surge models.(NAVLANTMETOCCEN Norfolk
"Hurricane Emily Sortie" brief, 1994) According to CDR Lilly, Operations
Officer, NAVLANTMETOCCEN Norfolk, three tools were used to analyze
'According to Mr. Dixon, Ship Routing Officer, NAVLANTMETOCCEN Norfolk, even
though the admirals overrode the oceanographers' recommendation and an unnecessary
sortie was conducted, "Everyone came out looking good." (Telephone conversation between
Pat Dixon, NAVLANTMETOCCEN Norfolk and the author, 10 May 1994)
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the threat: the Hurricane Havens Handbook for the North Atlantic Ocean
,
Automated Tropical Cyclone Forecasting Junior (ATCFjr) and GDS. These
decision aids are reviewed in Chapter IV. The most influential input came
from discussions on the NWS Hurricane Hotline (Sheets, 1990, p. 210)
which is used for a conference call involving a National Meteorological
Center forecaster, forecasters at local National Weather Service offices that
might be affected, and the National Hurricane Center hurricane specialist.
Surprisingly, CDR Lilly said that the command never received the U.S Navy
Strike and Wind Probability messages. (Telephone conversation between
CDR Lilly, NAVLANTMETOCCEN, Norfolk and the author, 9 May 1994)
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Although forecasting ability is steadily improving (see Chapter VI),
forecast errors have not diminished to the point where they can be ignored.
Lack of forecast accuracy is only part of the problem. A forecast
methodology has evolved that is oriented more toward the mentality of the
forecaster rather than the decision maker. The decision maker wants to
know "when, where and how badly will it affect me?" and he wants to know
in time to act on the information. The current forecast system provides this
information marginally or not at all beyond the 18-24 hour forecast period.
Brand (1992) believes that progress is already being made in this area:
"Over the past decade, there has been a shift in emphasis from the purely
environmental toward applied uses of meteorological data to aid the Navy
decision maker in tactical decision-making applications." (Brand, 1992, p.
32)
Forecasts need to be repackaged into a simple , user-friendly form so
that a decision maker can quickly assess the threat. This thesis will
examine how well the existing hurricane decision aids meet the needs of the
Navy decision maker facing a hurricane sortie decision for ships.8
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Research methodology includes an extensive literature review
covering the following pertinent topics: decision analysis, risk, hurricane
decision aids, disaster preparedness, cost effectiveness of weather
forecasting, and the estimation of hurricane costs. Interviews were
conducted with Sam Brand, Naval Research Laboratory, Monterey; Jerry
Jarrell, National Hurricane Center, Miami; Charles Neumann, Science
Applications International Corporation, Miami; Russell Elsberry, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey; Mary Clifford and Charlie Mauck, Fleet
Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography Center, Monterey; CDR
8Aircraft evacuation also presents a problem to the Navy decision maker. Although
aircraft sorties require a shorter lead time than ship sorties, a lower wind criterion is used
for aircraft sortie decisions. This thesis will focus mainly on ship sorties.
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Manthey, Naval Safety Center, Norfolk; and CDR Lilly and Pat Dixon, Naval
Atlantic Meteorology and Oceanography Center, Norfolk.
E. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS
Drawing from decision theory, risk analysis and utility theory, Chapter
II of this thesis defines the role that each of these disciplines plays in the
hurricane sortie decision. Chapter ID summarizes the research on hurricane
damage and preparation costs. Chapter IV reviews alternative decision aids
for assessing hurricane threats. ChapterV presents the CHARM nomograph
for setting hurricane conditions of readiness as the primary decision model
for resolving protect/do not protect dilemmas. Chapter VI discusses the
accuracy of Atlantic tropical cyclone forecasts. Chapter VII provides
recommendations for improving existing decision aids and incorporating
new ones. Possible areas for future research are suggested.
11
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IL CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE STUDY
A- INTRODUCTION
This chapter establishes the conceptual foundation for the remainder
of the thesis. The elements of decision analysis and the structuring of these
elements in the form of influence diagrams, decision trees and contingency
tables are presented as a framework for investigating the hurricane sortie
dilemma. The basic cost-loss ratio situation is introduced as the traditional
means of modeling the protect/do not protect problem, and decision criteria
for selecting the optimal course of action are considered. The chapter ends
with a discussion of the errors that can result from decision making under
uncertainty.
B. ELEMENTS OF DECISION ANALYSIS
Decision analysis imposes logical structure on the reasoning that
underlies decision making. According to Corner and Kirkwood (1991),
Decision analysis provides tools for quantitatively
analyzing decisions with uncertainty and/or multiple conflicting
objectives. These tools are especially useful when there is
limited, directly relevant data so that expert judgment plays a
significant role in the decision making process. (Marshall and
Oliver, 1994, p. 3)
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Decision analysis entails the consideration of five elements: actions,
events, probabilities, consequences and utilities (Winkler and Murphy, 1985,
p. 494). Each of these elements will be defined for the hurricane sortie
decision.
1. Actions
The first element is a set of courses of action. There is no decision
unless a choice is to be made among possible alternatives. It is important
that the decision maker consider all the options before paring down the list
for the purpose of modeling. Some potential courses of action in the face
of an approaching hurricane are: conduct a full sortie of all ships in port,
conduct a partial sortie9
,
or do nothing (wait for more accurate forecast). In
the typical model of the hurricane sortie problem, the decision maker selects
from only two courses of action: protect (P) and do not protect (P 1). In
Chapter V, P and P' denote "start to prepare" and "do not start to prepare",
respectively. These actions refer to the preparations associated with setting
hurricane readiness conditions.
2. Events
The consequence experienced by the decision maker depends not only
on the action taken, but on the outcome of one or more random events.
9Ship size is usually the determining factor when deciding which ships to sortie. Ships
with large sail areas (generally larger than frigate size) tend to drag anchor and therefore
should evade at sea.(Turpin and Brand, 1982, p. II- 1)
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Also known as states or variables, events are possible occurrences which are
partly or completely outside the decision maker's direct control (Barclay, et
al., 1977, p. 3). For the hurricane sortie problem, a whole range of variables
relating to the ship, the harbor and the hurricane are relevant:
a. Ship Variables
1) the ship's ability to maneuver and gain a favorable
position relative to the hurricane if the ship must get underway (i.e., power
and drag factors under adverse conditions);
2) the ship's ability to withstand adverse weather





3) support and repair facilities (normal and emergency);
4) port congestion;
5) quality of moorings and piers under adverse
conditions.
c. Environmental Variables
1) forecast track of the hurricane relative to the port;
2) forecast intensity, translation speed, and wind
distribution of the hurricane;
15
3) topography of the surrounding terrain and the
resulting influence on the harbor;
4) forecast storm surges, sea states and tides. (Brand,
1978, p. 374).
Most hurricane decision models narrow the focus to two events:
adverse weather is experienced (W) and adverse weather is not experienced
(W). In Chapter V, adverse weather is interpreted as the presence of
destructive winds (> 50 kts).
3. Probability Forecasts
The decision maker will want to obtain information or forecasts about
how likely it is that a particular act will result in each of the consequences.
The uncertainty regarding the event outcomes can be represented formally
by probabilities; of primary interest for the hurricane sortie decision are
strike and wind probability forecasts (see Chapter IV).
Murphy (1977) showed that, when the forecasts are reliable, the value
associated with probabilistic forecasts is greater than or equal to the value
associated with climatological and categorical forecasts for all activities
(Murphy, 1977, p. 815). For example, it is more helpful to know that the
probability of rain is 0.20 than it is to be told that, based on historical data,
Monterey has a 25% chance of getting rain on this date or to be told simply
16
that it will or will not rain today. The reliability of probability forecasts is
addressed in Chapter VI.
4. Consequences
The decision maker must also consider the possible consequences of
each action. For the hurricane sortie decision, if the decision maker fails to
protect and adverse weather does not occur, no cost is incurred and no
damage is suffered; the monetary consequence is zero. Failing to protect
when adverse weather does occur causes damage in the amount L. In the
simplest case, protection is 100% effective, but costs an amount C, whether
adverse weather is received or not. It is assumed that < C < L; otherwise,
the dominant strategy would be to never protect.
The consequences themselves may be stochastic. Murphy and Ye
(1990) described a time-dependent situation in which a decision maker
contemplates postponing the protect/do not protect decision in anticipation
of obtaining more accurate forecasts at some later time, but also recognizes
that the cost of protection will increase as lead time decreases (Murphy and
Ye, 1990, pp. 939-940). For the Navy decision maker, the penalty for
delaying may take the form of a smaller set of feasible actions rather than
higher protection costs. In Chapter V, the consequences experienced when
the decision is made to protect are a function of the probability of 30-kt
winds.
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There are serious consequences of hurricane sortie decisions (i.e., loss
of life, decreased crew morale, cancelled fleet exercises and decreased
national security due to reduced readiness of military bases) which cannot
be expressed in monetary terms. These consequences factor into the
decision-making process, but will not be explored in this thesis.
The Navy decision maker may experience individual or personal
consequences as a result of the action taken. The Navy policy is clear.
Prudent, early action by commanders and commanding
officers in response to tropical warnings is essential. Deviation
from standard and recommended hurricane evasion tactics can
be justified only by extreme operational necessity. Fleet
capabilities must not be degraded due to casualties resulting
from tropical storms and hurricanes. (CINCLANTFLT Letter
dated 13 April 1982)
If a decision is made to protect and the base subsequently receives
hurricane-force winds, the decision maker may be commended for having
chosen wisely. However, since protecting is the standard operating
procedure, the decision maker might be viewed as just having done his job.
If the hurricane misses the base, the dollars spent on the unnecessary sortie
would probably be considered a cost of doing business, no real loss to the
Navy. Chapter IE addresses whether or not this attitude is justified.
If, on the other hand, the Navy decision maker does not order a sortie
and disaster strikes, the decision maker may lose his career. If the decision
maker correctly interprets the threat as innocuous and opts to do nothing,
he invites criticism for risking the fleet. In this case, the decision maker is
18
not rewarded for saving the Navy the cost of protection, thus there is no
incentive for the decision maker to even assess the threat; the optimal
decision is to protect.
These individual consequences illustrate the need to incorporate in the
analysis the decision maker's preferences. Preferences are traditionally
measured in terms of utilities, which will be addressed in the next section.
5. Utilities
The last element in the decision analysis process is concerned with
how attractive or unattractive each possible consequence is to the decision
maker. This subjective measure of value is called utility. Utilities reflect the
decision maker's attitude toward risk. Three general types of utility
functions can be distinguished and are shown in Figure l. 10 (Moskowitz and
Wright, 1979, p. 160)
^Individuals may not exhibit the same attitude toward risk under all circumstances, thus
defying neat categorization. For example, a normally risk aversive person may purchase
a lottery ticket every Saturday.
19
Figure 1. Three General Types of Utililty Functions,
(from Moskowitz and Wright, 1979)
A concave-downward shape is characteristic of the utility curve for a
risk-averse individual who has a diminishing marginal utility for money. For
the risk averse, an additional dollar has less value than the last one gained,
therefore, a 50/50 chance of winning or losing a dollar will be unattractive.
The risk avoider "... will feel the loss of a dollar that he already has with a
pain that will exceed the pleasure to be gained from winning an additional
one." (Douglas, 1983, p. 43) The risk-averse person buys insurance,
preferring a certain small loss to avert the small chance of a large loss.
A linear function depicts the behavior of a person who is "neutral" to
risk. A risk-neutral individual is indifferent to an even bet and places the
same amount of value on the first dollar earned as on the last. For the risk
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neutral, maximizing expected utility is equivalent to maximizing expected
monetary value. For this reason, the linear model is frequently used.
The risk seeker's utility curve is concave-up, with the slope of the
utility curve increasing as the dollar amount increases. This type of person
willingly accepts gambles (risky ventures) that have a smaller expected
value than an alternative payoff received with certainty (riskless alternative)
.
For this risk-prone individual, the attractiveness of a possibly large payoff
in the gamble far outweighs the fact that the probability of such a payoff
may be exceedingly small. Chapter V provides interesting illumination on
utility theory in the area of losses.
C. STRUCTURES
The elements of decision analysis can be organized into influence
diagrams, decision trees and contingency tables. These structures can assist
in the solution of complex decision problems. Figure 2 depicts an influence
diagram for a situation in which a forecast or expert opinion is solicited in
order to improve the prediction of outcomes and reduce uncertainties











Figure 2. An Influence Diagram for the Protection Problem, (from
Marshall and Oliver, 1994)
The decision, event and result nodes are laid out from left to right, in the
order of occurrence. An initial decision D { must be selected from the
decision set Dj = {RA, RV, Forecast}, where RA represents choosing the
riskless alternative (P) and RV represents choosing the risky venture (P')
If RA is chosen, then result r2 (Q is obtained. Selecting RV could result in
either r
2
(L) or r3 (0), depending on the outcome of X. The random outcome
set X = {1 if it is a hurricane (W), if it is not a hurricane (W)}. If either
RA or RV are chosen, then a second decision need not be considered. If
Forecast is chosen, then the forecast outcome F must be observed before a
second decision D2 is selected from the set D2 = {RA, RV}; again, RA results
in r2 , whereas RV could result in rx or r3 . (Marshall and Oliver, 1994, pp.
270-271)
The directed arcs from D, and F to D2 indicate that both D! and F are
known to the decision maker before D2 is made and that their values may
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influence D2 . The arc from Dj to X indicates that the distribution of X
depends on the initial decision made. The arc from F to X implies that the
forecast and the event being forecast are related and that the distribution of
F is known when the distribution of X is being assessed. The three arcs
leading into R show that the result depends on both decisions and on the
random event, X. (Marshall and Oliver, 1994, p. 271)
The corresponding decision tree is given in Figure 3, where px is the
climatological probability, p F is the probability that the forecast will say it is
a hurricane, pj is the probability that it is a hurricane, given that the forecast
said it is a hurricane, and p is the probability that it is a hurricane, given
that the forecast said it is not a hurricane. As discussed previously, < C

































Figure 3. A Decision Tree for the Protection Problem, (from
Marshall and Oliver, 1994)
An alternative format is the contingency table. Other names for this
format are payoff matrix, game box, cost table, cost matrix, outcome table
and utility table, depending on what is put in the cells. Figure 4 is an
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example of a cost matrix where each cell contains the resultant cost







Figure 4. A Cost Table for the
Protection Problem, (after Winkler
and Murphy, 1985)
This is the structure that is used in Chapter V to illustrate the
derivation of the curves in the CHARM model. The table format is also used
to report the CHARM model results; however, the numbers in each cell will
represent frequencies, not costs. The next section will examine the
hurricane problem within the context of the cost-loss ratio situation and
discuss the solution of the problem using different decision criteria.
D. THE COST-LOSS RATIO SITUATION
The hurricane sortie problem has most frequently been viewed as a
cost-loss ratio situation (Thompson, 1952) in which a decision maker must
decide ". . . whether or not to protect an activity or operation against adverse
weather in the face of uncertainty as to whether or not such weather
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conditions will actually occur." (Murphy and Ye, 1990, p. 939) In this "game
against nature", it is assumed that the decision maker will try to select the
activity that will yield the lowest expected losses, regardless of the weather
outcome. 11 Thompson and Brier (1955) showed that, for a continuing series
of repetitive operations, the optimum long-run economic gain will be
realized if protective measures are taken if P > C/L, where P is the
probability of adverse weather, C is the cost of taking protective measures
on a single occasion and L is the loss suffered on each occasion that adverse
weather occurs and protective measures have not been taken. Similarly,
protective measures should not be taken if P < C/L. The decision maker will
be indifferent between the two actions when P = C/L. The value C/L
therefore represents a critical ratio (sometimes referred to as a cost-benefit
ratio), above which protection is the optimal course of action and below
which it is not. (Thompson and Brier, 1955, p. 250) Subsequent studies
involving the cost-loss ratio situation have been undertaken by Nelson and
Winter (1960), Thompson (1962), Shorr (1966), Anderson and Burnham
(1973), Murphy (1977), Jarrell and Brand (1981), Winkler and Murphy
(1985), Murphy and Ye (1990) and others. 12
"Recall that this assumption is equivalent to assuming that the decision maker's utilities
are linearly related to the expenses. This model also assumes a rational decision maker.
,2Not everyone agrees that the cost-loss ratio is a good decision criterion. In fact, in a
lecture on measuring the values of action alternatives using "social utilities," Ward Edwards
(1971) emphasized that the "knapsack" problem (a special optimization problem where
there is a budget constraint) "is the only case ... in which the famous benefit-to-cost ratio
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Several non-probabilistic decision criteria have been developed for
individuals who may prefer not to use probabilities in their analyses. The
maximin payoff, the minimax payoff, the maximax payoff and the minimax
regret will be discussed briefly in terms of the hurricane sortie decision
(refer to Figure 4).
Maximin is the criterion of pessimism. Under this principle, the
decision maker assumes that once he has chosen a course of action, nature
or the system will be malevolent and select the event that minimizes the
decision makefs payoff. 13 The decision maker, therefore, should pick the
best of the worst and always protect. (Buck, 1989, p.35) Likewise, a
decision maker using a minimax strategy (minimizing the maximum payoff)
will choose to always protect.
Maximax, on the other hand, is an extremely optimistic criterion.
Here the decision maker considers the largest payoff (best outcome) for
each action over all possible events and, of these, chooses the course of
action for which the payoff is the largest. For the cost-loss ratio situation,
the best outcomes are C for P and for P', which means that the decision
is an appropriate figure on which to base a decision." (American Society for Engineering
Education, 1980, p. 126) Furthermore, Edwards' approach to decision making ignored
probabilities altogether. Pointing out that there is no such thing as a riskless choice in the
real world, Edwards rationalized, "If you are uncertain enough, it's the same as though you
were certain." As Edwards was quick to admit, these were heretical ideas for 1971 and are
not views which have been readily accepted by others in the field today. (American Society
for Engineering Education, 1980, p. 120)
13
"Payoff refers to a negative cost.
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maker should never protect since is preferred to C. (Winkler and Murphy,
1985, p. 500)
In order to use a minimax regret criterion, the cost matrix must first
be converted into its corresponding regret matrix by subtracting each entry
in the cost matrix from the best outcome in its column. Minimax can then
be applied to the regret matrix. The decision maker following this rule will
protect if C < (L - Q or if 0.5 > C/L.
E. TYPE I AND TYPE H ERRORS
When conducting a hypothesis test, there are two kinds of errors
which can be made, type I and type II. Type I errors result from rejecting
the null hypothesis when it is true. Type II errors result from failing to
reject the null when it is false. Obviously, it is desirable to keep both type
I and type II errors at a minimum. 14 It is possible to eliminate all type I
errors by making the rejection region extremely small, but this causes an
increase in the probability of a type II error.
This tradeoff can be seen in the hurricane sortie problem. Let the null
hypothesis be the status quo, that destructive winds will not affect the
military base. The alternate hypothesis, then, is that the base will be hit by
destructive winds. A type I error in this case would result in a false alarm:
14The only way to reduce simultaneously the probabilities of both errors occurring is to
reduce the variance, which for the hurricane sortie problem means improving forecast
accuracy.
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protecting (P) when adverse weather is not experienced (W). A type II error
is much more serious: failing to protect (P') and being caught unexpectedly
by adverse weather (W). By setting as a goal the elimination of all
unnecessary sorties, the probability of incurring ship damage due to adverse
weather increases. In the CHARM model, decision makers are allowed to
choose confidence levels for correctly setting hurricane readiness conditions
(see Chapter V). Although most decision makers would want to be 100%
sure that the course of action they are taking is the right one, selecting a
confidence level of 100% guarantees higher overwarning rates. 15 (Kostyshack
and Jarrell, 1984, p. 13)
Thompson (1952) spoke to the desirability of an optimal balance
between type I and type II errors:
The relative importance of these two kinds of errors
depends upon the nature of the operation for which the
prediction is used .... The usual forecast is aimed at suiting
the "average" user, and it is generally considered desirable that
the two types of errors be equal . . . (Thompson, 1952, p. 224)
In the hurricane sortie problem, because typically C < < < L, it is preferable
to err on the side of caution and accept a few unnecessary sorties in order
to reduce the probability of a huge loss. Clearly, the probability of a type I
error should far outweigh the probability of a type II error, but to what
degree? This is where the cost-loss ratio comes into play. In Chapter III,
l5In this context, "overwarning" refers to setting a condition of readiness that later
proves to be unwarranted by the weather conditions.
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past attempts at quantifying hurricane costs in order to estimate the cost-




This chapter summarizes the results of a literature review of works
dealing with the economics of hurricanes. Earlier studies by Harold
Demsetz (1962), Arnold Sugg (1966) and Malone and Leimer (1971) are still
relevant and provide the basis for later works by Anderson and Burnham
(1973), Charles Neumann (1975) and Brand and Blelloch (1975). For each
study, a brief synopsis will be given of the research methodology and results
as they pertain to preparation costs, hurricane losses, and savings due to
improvements in forecasting. Estimates of tropical cyclone damage to Navy
vessels while moored or anchored, as well as recent estimates of ship sortie
costs will also be reported.
B. HURRICANE COST ESTIMATION STUDIES
1. Demsetz (1962)
In a RAND study, Demsetz (1962) suggested that the annual tropical
storm cost for a specific region given imperfect forecasting could be
computed as the sum of the annual preparation costs, the annual damage
costs caused by storms for which prior warning is received, and the annual
damage costs caused by storms for which no prior warning is received.
Similarly, the annual tropical storm cost given perfect forecasting could be
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calculated as the number of storm warnings per year multiplied by the sum
of the protection cost per storm and the damage cost per storm where prior
warning is received. (Demsetz, 1962, pp. 7-9) These costs were estimated
for Miami, Florida using records of two storms which struck the Miami area.
A tropical storm that occurred on 10 September 1960 provided an example
of a storm of moderate intensity for which adequate warning was received.
Total private and public preparation costs for this storm in 1962 dollars were
estimated as $1.2 million and total damage costs as $6.6 million (Demsetz,
1962, p. 7). Going back in the archives to October 1950, Demsetz found an
intense storm for which only short notice was given which he used as the
basis for his estimate of the damages caused by an average storm for which
no prior warning was received. Again using 1962 dollars, this intense
hurricane caused approximately $12.7 million in damages; Demsetz placed
the cost of damage caused by an average storm without warning slightly
higher at $13 million. (Demsetz, 1962, p. 11)
Finally, the value of forecasting was investigated by comparing
Miami's annual storm costs resulting from four different warning systems.
The difference between no warning system and a perfect warning system
represented the maximum gain that could be expected from forecasting.
The annual storm cost, given no forecasts, was estimated as $7.54 million
in 1962 dollars (.58 storms/year x $13 million). The annual storm cost, given
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perfect forecasts, was estimated as $4.51 million in 1962 dollars, for a total
savings of about $3 million a year.(Demsetz, 1962, pp. 13-14)
2. Sugg (1966)
Sugg (1966) estimated from survey data the average annual hurricane
costs for the United States and Canada as $309.55 million in 1966 dollars.
Hurricane damage accounted for $300 million of the total, with the balance
split among aircraft reconnaissance, communications, protection of homes
and businesses, evacuation, and special interests, including military
installations. The cost attributed to special interests was estimated using
the following logic:
A total of six or eight of these [special interests] may be
found within a single warning area with losses for any one
ranging from $0,025 to $0.1 million and as high as $0.5 million
for the Cape Canaveral or the Houston-Galveston areas.
Depending upon the area threatened, this figure may vary from
$0.4 to $1.8 million for a single storm and would be $0.6 to $2.7
million for the average season. Attempting to weigh these
results, one arrives at a crude estimate of $2 million loss for the
average hurricane season borne by the special interests. (Sugg,
1966, p. 144)
Using 1966 dollars, Sugg estimated further that the cost of overwarning
could range from $7 to $17 million annually and that the hurricane warning
service saves about $25 million during an average season and as much as
$100 million during a very active season (Sugg, 1966, p. 145).
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3. A U.S. Air Force Study (1970)
The United States Air Force directed a study of Air Force response
to hurricane forecasts so that the impact of improved forecasts could be
estimated. The result was an unpublished memorandum dated December
1970. Eight Air Force bases in the southeastern United States provided
information regarding actions taken in response to the setting of hurricane
readiness conditions, costs associated with these actions and any history of
hurricane activity at that installation. The reports varied greatly. The cost
to secure the base ranged from $1,000 to $10,000 in 1970 dollars. The cost
of aircraft evacuation ranged from $10,000 to $100,000 in 1970 dollars. On
the average, installations evacuated aircraft three or four times for every
time they were actually "hit" by a hurricane. Bases were estimated to have
been secured against hurricanes twice as often as they were evacuated. The
author noted that statistics on how often the actions were actually taken
usually were not available. (Air Weather Service, 1970, pp. 1-2)
4. Malone and Leimer (1971)
Malone and Leimer (1971) conducted a study for the U.S. Air Force
involving 197 military bases in the western North Atlantic to determine the
economic benefit to DOD of improved hurricane forecasts. The following
methodology was used to estimate the number of times that hurricane
readiness conditions were declared unnecessarily:
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a. All tropical storm advisories for the North Atlantic from
1965-1970 were examined in order to identify those installations which
received warnings of winds > 50 kt.
b. Two computer programs were written to compensate for the
unavailability of complete records at each base. Using the advisories and
the mean forecast position errors for 1965-1969, the first program created
a theoretical warning area for each forecast and tallied the number of
installations falling within the warning area. 16 This step was repeated twice
more, first using a 20% reduction in the mean forecast error and then using
a 40% reduction in the mean forecast error.
c. The second program identified, using a criterion of winds >
50 kt, which of the installations were actually struck by a particular storm.
d. The results of the two programs were then compared for
each storm to determine the number of unnecessary warnings at each level.
(Malone and Leimer, 1971, pp. 6-14)
From 1965-1970, the total number of unnecessary warnings for the
197 installations were 170, 408 and 1230 for Conditions I, II, and III,
respectively. A reduction of 20% in the mean forecast errors produced a
decrease of 18.2%, 23.5%, and 19.8% in the number of times Conditions I,
n, and HI were set unnecessarily. A 40% reduction resulted in decreases of
,6Base commanders of installations located within warning areas were assumed to have
set the appropriate conditions of readiness.
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32.3%, 44.1%, and 42.5% for Conditions I, D, and III when compared to the
results using the mean forecast errors. (Malone and Leimer, 1971, p. 15)
Malone and Leimer also estimated preparation costs for a sample of
22 installations in the Atlantic area. Disaster Preparedness Officers at each
of the bases provided estimates of direct "out of pocket" preparation costs,
costs of manpower diverted from normal duty for storm preparations, and
costs of manpower idled by cessation of normal duties (Malone and Leimer,
1971, p. 6). The average preparation costs in 1971 dollars were $124,800 for
Condition I, $45,000 for Condition II, and $8,100 for Conditions III and IV
combined (Malone and Leimer, 1971, p. 19). Relating these costs to the
number of unnecessary warnings, Malone and Leimer concluded that the
annual savings to DOD for all western North Atlantic installations would be
$1.7 million if there were a 20% improvement in hurricane forecasting and
$3.2 million with a 40% improvement (Malone and Leimer, 1971, p. 22). 17
Neumann (1975) analyzed the data from Malone and Leimer (1971)
and concluded that approximately 8.3 military bases lie within an average
300 nm hurricane warning area. The average cost per base in 1971 was
found to be $1 97,000. 18 Adjusting to 1975 dollars, Neumann estimated the
17MaIone and Leimer (1971) did not include ship sortie costs or cost savings from
decreased damages resulting from better forecasts.
18The sum of the average preparation costs per base for Conditions 1, II, III and IV is
$177,900 ($124,800 + $45,000 + $8,100). Taking the average of each base's total
preparation costs yields $177,836.64. $197,000 may be the result of a clerical error.
36
cost of protection for each installation as $2,458,100. (Neumann, 1975, p.
16)
An unpublished cost study prepared for the National Hurricane Center
in 1993 also cited Malone and Leimer (1971) as the most recent
comprehensive study on military hurricane preparedness. The average cost
of protection per base in 1990 dollars (using $197,000 as the 1971 figure)
was estimated as $704,334. Still using 8.3 as the average number of bases
per warning area (most likely high due to base closures), the average cost
per warning area was approximately $5 billion in 1990 dollars. (National
Hurricane Center, unpublished cost study, 1993, p. 64)
5. Anderson and Burnham (1973)
Anderson and Burnham (1973) reported that approximately 15% of
hurricane damage to residential and commercial property can be prevented
if appropriate measures are taken (White, 1971). Unfortunately, only 20%
of the population take protective action (Sugg, 1967) and about $8.64 million
in 1971 dollars is lost unnecessarily. (Anderson and Burnham, 1973, p. 126)
To estimate a specific region's response to forecast warnings, Anderson and
Burnham (1973) used the cost matrix shown in Figure 5, where H is
hurricane, H' is no hurricane, A is action taken and A is no action taken.
(Anderson and Burnham, 1973, p. 127) The general form of the




$26,460/1,000 people $4,000/1,000 people
$44,673/1,000 people O
Figure 5. Anderson/Burnham Hurricane Protection
Model, (after Anderson and Burnham, 1973)
The payoffs, expressed in costs per capita, were derived from
Demsetz's study of hurricane damage in Miami, Florida (Demsetz, 1962).
Anderson and Burnham hypothesized that the same proportional
relationship would hold for all regions. A cost table for a particular locality
can be found by multiplying each cell by the area's population, in thousands.
The expected value of the two alternatives can be calculated using Px , the
climatological probability of hurricane occurrence in that region. 19 Anderson
and Burnham then estimated the potential annual savings as the difference
between expected cost with perfect forecasting and the expected cost with
no forecasting. Assuming people would not protect in the absence of
forecasting, the expected cost of taking no action (the result of (A', H)
multiplied by Px) was used to estimate the expected cost with no forecasting.
With perfect forecasting, protection would be taken only when a hurricane
l9Climatological probabilities can be found in Simpson and Riehl (1981, p. 376).
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is inevitable, reducing the expected cost to the result of (A, H) multiplied by
Px . (Anderson and Burnham, 1973, p. 128)
6. Brand and Blelloch (1975)
According to Brand and Blelloch (1975), approximately 100 U.S. Navy
and DOD-contracted vessels operate in the western North Pacific at any one
time, usually with over half of these ships in port. Ship sortie costs were
attributed to fuel consumption, pilot and tug fees, boat transportation to the
ship, readying the ship to get underway, and for contracted vessels, the daily
rate plus overtime paid to personnel. All cost estimates are given in 1975
dollars.
During threatening conditions, fuel costs per day were estimated as
$1500 for small ships (e.g., destroyers), $5000 for medium-size ships (e.g.,
amphibious or supply type) and $30,000 for large ships (carriers). Pilot and
tug fees (for leaving and returning to port) ranged from a few hundred
dollars for small ships to over $5000 for carriers. Costs of boat
transportation to ships varied from less than a hundred dollars to thousands
of dollars. The costs to "light off' the boilers ranged from hundreds of
dollars to thousands of dollars. For those contracted or chartered vessels,
the DOD cost of typhoon evasion or delays in ship routing was estimated as
$8000-10,000 per day for each day of lost time. The total annual cost for
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typhoon evasion and sortie in the western North Pacific was estimated to
reach into the millions of dollars. (Brand and Blelloch, 1975, p. 354.)
Brand and Blelloch (1975) next examined the effects of a 20%
improvement in the 48-hour, right-angle forecast error20 on sortie decisions
for Okinawa, given a decision criterion of 30-kt winds. Assuming 200 n mi
as the average distance to the 30-kt wind isotach and 145 n mi as the
average right-angle forecast error for 48 hours, the authors hypothesized the
following scenario: if a storm is approximately 48 hours from Okinawa and
the predicted storm track is within 345 n mi (200 n mi + 145 n mi) of
Okinawa, then the decision would be to sortie. With a 20% improvement in
the 48-h, right-angle forecast error, the critical value drops from 345 n mi
to 316 n mi. Each tropical cyclone with a Closest Point of Approach to
Okinawa falling in the range from 316 n mi to 345 n mi represents a sortie
decision that would have gone the other way had the forecast error been
20% lower. The total number of tropical cyclones per year falling in this
range for all eight western North Pacific bases in the sample from 1947-1970
was 5.85. Estimating an average sortie cost of $50,00021 , Brand and Blelloch
figured the annual savings attributed to the elimination of 5.85 unnecessary
20The right-angle forecast error refers to the perpendicular distance from the forecast
position to the best track as determined by post-analysis.
21Brand and Blelloch chose $50,000 as the average sortie cost even though they had
previously estimated the total cost to be in the millions, because some of the bases in the
study are good typhoon havens which eliminates the need to sortie.
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sorties per year to be $292,000 in 1975 dollars. (Brand and Blelloch, 1975,
pp. 355-357)
C. TROPICAL CYCLONE MISHAP STATISTICS
According to the Naval Safety Center database, from 1 January 1969
to 11 July 1994 there were three incidents reported Navy-wide of ship
damage caused by tropical cyclones and incurred while the ship was either
moored or anchored. The damage costs given for the three storms were
$190,000 in 1989 dollars, $43,800 in 1991 dollars and $12,000 in 1991
dollars, respectively. (Commander, Naval Safety Center Letter, 20 July
1994) In all likelihood, the number of hurricane-related incidents occurring
in port is much higher than three; the USS Regulus mishap of 1971
mentioned in Chapter I is conspicuously missing from the report. In fact,
the first incident in the report is not until 29 March 1978, nine years into the
alleged report period. Estimates of damage costs may be low, as they are
based on the damage assessment made by the Commanding Officer
reporting the mishap, not on the actual costs to repair. (Brown, 1993, p. 13)
D. HURRICANE EMILY SORTIE COSTS
The Naval Atlantic Meteorology and Oceanography Center
(NAVLANTMETOCCEN), Norfolk, Virginia estimated the following sortie
costs by ship type for Hurricane Emily in 1993 dollars: CV, $150,000; LHA,
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$58,000; CG, $38,000; DD, $35,000; FF, $16,000; SSN, $2,100. The
estimated cost for a partial sortie out of Norfolk of 15 ships, eight
submarines and 10,807 personnel was $690,000. Forty-five ships remained
in port. Charleston, South Carolina did not actually sortie its ships,
however, an estimated $212,000 was spent readying 14 ships, five
submarines and 4,400 personnel for sortie. (NAVLANTMETOCCEN Norfolk
"Hurricane Emily Sortie" brief, 1994)
E. SUMMARY
It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to make a direct and reliable
estimate of the cost-loss ratio as it relates to the hurricane sortie decision.
In Chapter V, the CHARM model avoids this problem by letting the
confidence level indirectly determine the cost-loss ratio. Although past
attempts to quantify the costs of protection and losses due to hurricane
damage have produced limited results, it is clear that the cost of
unnecessary sorties is not inconsequential. As was discussed in Chapter II,
the consequence received depends not only on the decision made, but on the
outcomes of numerous random events which are beyond the control of the
decision maker. It is this uncertainty which renders invaluable the decision
aids reviewed in the next two chapters.
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IV. ALTERNATIVE TACTICAL DECISION AIDS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter covers some of the existing tactical decision aids (TDA)
for assessing hurricane threats. Not all of these decision aids are currently
being used by Navy decision makers. Availability and costs are critical
issues when considering commercial software packages such as Enhanced
GDS and GDS Toolkit (GDSC
,
Hazards Management Group, Inc., 1990) and
the Cyclone/Hurricane Acceptable Risk Model (CHARM®, Science
Applications, Inc., 1982). Each decision aid will be discussed in terms of its
purpose, features, inputs, advantages and disadvantages (where appropriate)
and ability to assist the decision maker with preparation decisions.
B. U.S. NAVY PRODUCTS
1. U.S. Navy Strike and Wind Probability Forecast Program
The U.S. Navy Strike and Wind Probability Forecast Program has
been in operational use in the western Pacific since 1979 and in the North
Atlantic since 1981. (Turpin and Brand, 1982, p. 1-14) Although expressing
forecasts in probabilistic terms began as a "parochial U.S. Navy regional
effort," the strike probability forecast has been adopted by several
government agencies, foreign and domestic, as well as by the private sector.
(Jarrell and Brand, 1983, p. 1050) The derivation of strike and wind
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probabilities was based on studies of tropical cyclone forecast errors (Jarrell,
et al., 1978; Thompson and Elsberry, 1979; Jarrell, 1980; Jarrell, 1981;
Neumann and Pelissier, 1981; and Thompson, et al., 1981) and assumes that
the forecast errors follow a bivariate normal distribution. Readers interested
in a detailed description of the methodology are directed to Jarrell and
Brand (1981) and Jarrell and Brand (1983).
Jarrell and Brand (1981) arbitrarily defined a "strike" as occurring
when the track of a storm passes within 75 nm to the left or 50 nm to the
right of a point of interest (close enough to cause damage). There are two
types of strike probabilities, instantaneous and time-integrated. An
instantaneous strike probability is the chance in percent that the tropical
cyclone will occupy a specific point in space and time (i.e., the probability
that the hurricane will hit Norfolk 24 hours from now). A time-integrated
strike probability is the probability that the cyclone will strike the point of
interest at any time within the forecast period (i.e., the probability that the
hurricane will hit Norfolk sometime within the next 24 hours).
Strike probabilities, by themselves, have limited usefulness, because
they do not take into account the severity of the storm. Wind probabilities
provide a better measure of the threat by incorporating information about
the storm's present and forecast wind distribution and maximum wind
speed. (Jarrell and Brand, 1983, p. 1052) Since wind probabilities are
derived from strike probabilities, the wind probability simultaneously allows
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for error in all forecast elements (track, forward speed, maximum wind and
wind distribution), making it particularly useful to the decision maker
(Jarrell and Brand, 1983, p.1050).
The National Hurricane Center (NHQ forecast provides the input for
the U.S. Navy Strike and Wind Probability Forecast Program. While a
tropical cyclone is threatening, Fleet Numerical Meteorology and
Oceanography Center (FNMOQ, Monterey transmits a strike and wind
probability message every six hours. Each message gives both
instantaneous and time-integrated strike and 30- and 50-kt wind
probabilities at 12-hour increments over a 72-hour forecast period for
affected U.S. Navy and coastal Air Force points of interest. Figure 6 shows
the message format, HHPIPS, where HH is the forecast period, PI is the
instantaneous probability, and PS is the time-integrated probability.
Probabilities are rounded to the nearest whole percent. IN means
"insignificant," which is defined as less than one percent. (Jarrell and Brand,
1981, p. 183)
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Figure 6. Strike and Wind Probability Message,
(from Jarrell and Brand, 1981)
Because the time-integrated event includes many instantaneous
events, time-integrated probabilities will be at least as large as the
instantaneous probabilities and usually much larger. Instantaneous
probabilities are more useful to decision makers concerned with moving
targets (i.e., ships), whereas users at fixed locations (i.e., cities, bases) will
prefer the time-integrated probabilities. (Jarrell and Brand, 1983, pp. 1050-
1052)
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In general, it is better to compare probabilities at several sites rather
than to try to interpret the magnitude of the probability at a single point of
interest. This practice may help the decision maker who might be inclined
to ignore a 72-hour strike probability of "only" lO^o.22
The Navy Wind and Strike Probability Users Manual (Iurpin and
Brand, 1981) suggests using as a starting point the following threshold
values of time-integrated strike probabilities for the setting of hurricane
threat conditions:





> 5% within 72 hours
> 10% within 48 hours
> 20% within 24 hours
> 30% within 12 hours
Decision makers are cautioned against ordering a higher condition of
readiness based on these objective criteria without giving further
22The National Weather Service (NWS) issues their own hurricane and tropical storm
probabilities for 44 selected locations from Brownsville, Texas to Eastport, Maine. The
NWS defines the probability of a strike as the likelihood that the center of the storm will
pass within 65 miles of the point of interest(ie., within the radius of hurricane force winds
for an average storm) at the forecast time. This is analogous to the instantaneous strike
probability issued by the U.S. Navy. Using this definition, if a storm is forecast to be
directly over the point of interest in 72 hours, the maximum probability is 10%! At 48 hours
from predicted landfall, the maximum probability is 13-18%. At 36 hours, the maximum
probability is 20-25%. At 24 hours, the maximum probability is 35-45%. When the storm
is less than 24 hours from forecast landfall the values increase more rapidly, reaching up
to 60-70%. (Lee County Division of Public Safety, 1993)
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consideration to the individual circumstances of the threat. (Turpin and
Brand, 1982, p. 1-17)
The CHARM model in ChapterV provides another objective measure
of the threat; however, that model relies on 30- and 50-kt wind probabilities
rather than on strike probabilities. Chapter VI addresses the accuracy of
these probability forecasts.
2. ATCF and ATCFjr
The Automated Tropical Cyclone Forecasting (ATCF) System, Version
2.6 (Miller, et al., 1988) is a microcomputer-based forecasting tool that was
designed to replace the grease pencils, acetates, clipboards and paper
records that were still in use at the Joint Typhoon Warning Center, Guam
in 1989. The following are some of the forecasting functions performed by
ATCF: plot fixes of storm location, plot forecast tracks, evaluate the plotted
information (including various objective forecast tracks) and make position
and wind forecasts, compute forecast errors and other statistics, prepare
messages and make best tracks. (Miller, et al., 1989, p.l)
ATCFjr, Version 2.73 (Miller, et al., 1993) is the short version of
ATCF. ATCFjr is a menu-driven IBM compatible software package that
allows the user to graphically display and analyze an official tropical cyclone
warning. The data from the NHC warning message can be entered manually
or retrieved automatically using ATCFjr's decoder. ATCFjr can then be used
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to display against various map backgrounds the cyclone track, the size of
the hurricane and the position of wind radii. ATCFjr will also compute the
closest point of approach (CPA) to any location (longitude/latitude) in the
system. (Miller, et al., 1993, p.l)
CDR Lilly, Operations Officer, NAVLANTMETOCCEN Norfolk
expressed some concerns about ATCFjr's user-friendliness, finding the
program to be geared more toward the forecaster than the decision maker.
Furthermore, ATCFjr does not incorporate strike and wind probabilities.
(Telephone conversation between CDR Lilly, NAVLANTMETOCCEN
Norfolk and the author, 9 May 1994) FNMOC has already identified as an
action item the correction of the latter deficiency. (Interview between Mary
Clifford, FNMOC, Monterey and the author, 13 May 1994).
C. HURRICANE HAVENS HANDBOOK FOR THE NORTH ATLANTIC
OCEAN
Developed by the Naval Environmental Prediction Research Facility
(now the Naval Research Laboratory, Monterey), The Hurricane Havens
Handbook for the North Atlantic Ocean (Turpin and Brand, 1982) evaluates
22 deep water ports as to their suitability as hurricane havens for the
Atlantic fleet. The purpose of the Handbook is to aid commanders and
commanding officers in the assessment of hurricane threats.
(CINCLANTFLT Letter, 13 April 1982)
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For each port, detailed descriptions are given of the port location,
surrounding topography, harbor and harbor facilities, including heavy
weather facilities and hurricane anchorages. In addition, the following areas
of concern are addressed:
1. tropical cyclone climatology for the port;
2. effects of topography on hurricane-associated winds and seas;
3. effects of storm surge, tide and wave action within the harbor;
4. factors to consider when deciding whether to evade at sea or
remain in port. (Brand, 1978, pp. 375-377)
The first section of the Handbook provides general guidance on
warnings, forecasts and hurricane sortie decisions. Figure 7 contains a
graph from this section which displays a few of the factors that affect the
"leave/stay" decision. (Turpin and Brand, 1982, p. 1-2) It is easy to see how
a decision maker could be somewhat daunted by the number of variables
that need to be considered.
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Figure 7. Factors in the Sortie Decision, (from Turpin and Brand, 1982)
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Also contained in this section is an interpretation of the Near Pass
Probability charts included with each port evaluation. These charts can be
used to find the probability that a tropical cyclone will pass within 180 n mi
of a point of interest. Turpin and Brand (1982) recommended that the actual
and forecast positions of a tropical cyclone be plotted on the chart
appropriate to the time of year. At three days and beyond, the
climatological probabilities can provide prior notice of a possible encounter
up to six days in advance. As soon as the position of the tropical cyclone
reaches the 3-4 day time line, attention should be turned to the strike and
wind probability forecasts. (Turpin and Brand, 1982, p. 1-5) An example of
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Figure 8. Norfolk, Virginia Near Pass Probability Chart for August,
(from Turpin and Brand, 1982)
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The selection of a 180 n mi radius around the point of interest was a
concession made to the Handbook users. Jerry Jarrell, National Hurricane
Center, insists that a typical size hurricane would probably not have any
effect this far away from the point of landfall, much less cause damage. For
the maximum extent of severe damage, the National Hurricane Center uses
75 n mi to the left of center and 50 n mi to the right, coincident with the
definition of strike used in the derivation of the U.S. Navy Strike and Wind
Probabilities. According to Jarrell, when a smaller, more reasonable radius
was used, Navy decision makers were disappointed that the resultant
probabilities were so low.23 Increasing the radius to 180 n mi artificially
inflated the strike probabilities to 20-30%. (Interview between Jerry Jarrell,
National Hurricane Center, Miami and the author, 6 June 1994).
The Hurricane Havens Handbook for the North Atlantic Ocean is a
tremendously valuable source of information. Decision makers who may
someday face a hurricane sortie decision should, at a minimum, be familiar
with the section pertaining to their port and with the general guidance
provided in Section I. However, for specific actions to be taken when severe
weather threatens, the Handbook defers to the local destructive weather
instructions.
23This is not surprising. Individuals tend to discard low probability events and ignore
high probability events, focusing their attention on the middle range of probabilities that
lie within their cognitive threshold (Douglas, 1985, p. 30).
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D. LOCAL DESTRUCTIVE WEATHER INSTRUCTIONS
The Destructive Weather Plan for Norfolk, Virginia was reviewed as
an example of a local destructive weather instruction. The stated purpose
of the plan is: ". . . to publish guidance and procedures to be employed by
commands and activities in the SOPA Hampton Roads area in the event of
destructive weather (tropical storms, hurricanes, thunderstorms, tornadoes,
gales, and severe windstorms)." (COMNAVBASENORVA/SOPA (ADMIN)
HAMPTONINST 3141. IS, 18 May 1993, p.l)
In the Destructive Weather Plan, definitions of the different storm
systems, warnings and readiness conditions are given as well as the actions
required to achieve each condition of readiness. The section entitled "Sortie
and Evasion" states clearly and succinctly the main points from the
Hurricane Havens Handbook for the North Atlantic Ocean , stating in no
uncertain terms the options and risks, while adding essential information
about the timing of the sortie decision:
The Fleet should be prepared to get underway at, or
shortly after, Condition III (destructive winds expected within
48 hours). The following time considerations are critical factors
of a sortie decision:
(1) Night sorties should be avoided due to safety of
navigation (possible delay of 8 hours, or longer).
(2) A Norfolk sortie will require nearly 12 hours to get
all ships underway.
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(3) Sea and Anchor details will be approximately 3 hours
long due to limited harbor pilot assets and shipping congestion.
(4) Due to potential storm recurvature and inherent
forecast error, ships will usually need to run nearly 200 nm to
comfortably evade the storm (13 hour transit at 15 kts). This
transit will be in less than optimal sea states due to rapid swell
propagation in advance of tropical cyclones.
Factoring in the above delays, total time of storm evasion from
pierside, for ships in the latter stage of a major sortie, could
take more than 36 hours.
(COMNAVBASENORVA/SOPA(ADMIN)HAMPTONINST
3141. IS, 18 May 1993, p.4)
E. ENHANCED GDS AND GDS TOOLKIT
Enhanced GDS andGDS Toolkit (GDSC
,
Hazards Management Group,
Inc., 1990) together provide a powerful hurricane response tactical decision
aid. Using the forecasts and storm information contained in the Public and
Marine Advisories24 issued by the National Hurricane Center, Enhanced
GDS performs all of the functions of a basic hurricane tracking program
such as ATCFjr. GDS Toolkit contains utility programs and files for use
with Enhanced GDS. A few of the features in Enhanced GDS not included
in ATCFjr will be described here, as well as two of GDS Toolkit's
subprograms.
The NAVLANTMETOCCEN Norfolk purchased Enhanced GDS for
$600 following a Hazards Management Group demonstration at a hurricane
"Marine advisories are normally issued four hours after the forecasts are made,
therefore the forecast positions are valid for times 8, 20, 32, 44 and 68 hours following the
time the Marine Advosory is issued. (Hazards Management Group, Inc., 1990, p. 4)
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conference. In terms of the system's adaptability to military use, only one
drawback was noted: all of the times are given in local time, not Zulu.
(Telephone conversation between CDR Lilly, NAVLANTMETOCCEN
Norfolk and the author, 9 May 1994) GDS Toolkit, which includes GDS
Chart, GDS Grab, GDS Bootstrap and Shiftrack, costs $195 and must be
used in conjunction with Enhanced GDS. (Hazards Management Group,
Inc., 1990, p. 25)
1. Enhanced GDS
The amount of time remaining for storm preparations can be found
based on three different scenarios. Assuming forecasts are correct
.
Enhanced GDS will calculate how much time remains before either the
storm center or winds of a certain velocity reach the closest point of
approach (CPA) to a point of interest. If the storm is not currently forecast
to pass near the point of interest or to reach its CPA soon, the decision
maker may want to see a "worst case" calculation made using the
assumption that the storm will take a direct path to the point of interest.
For this calculation, Enhanced GDS can use either the storm's current
forward speed or the forecast forward speed. The third alternative
incorporates into the calculation the average error made by the National
Hurricane Center. This often provides the most plausible estimate of the
time remaining. (Hazards Management Group, Inc., 1990, p. 7)
57
Decision makers may want to know how much time they have left
before they must decide whether or not to initiate a particular response
action. Enhanced GDS has two features that can assist the decision maker
in keeping track of these decision points. First, the decision maker provides
optimistic, normal and pessimistic estimates of "lead times" needed to
complete the various response actions. Then, using any of the assumptions
discussed above as the criterion for the interruption of storm preparations,
Enhanced GDS will compute for different storm intensities the time
remaining until the initiation of each response action is required. The
results are presented in tabular form. (Hazards Management Group, Inc.,
1990, p. 8)
The second option graphically represents the response lead time
requirement and the storm intensity (size and forward speed) as a "Decision
Arc" or "Encroachment Circle" around the point of interest. When the
storm's "wind field" or isotach for a particular wind speed reaches the
decision arc, the response must be initiated if it is to be finished before the
winds arrive at the point of interest. Enhanced GDS will calculate the time
remaining before the circles intersect. (Hazards Management Group, Inc.,
1990, p. 8)
At this point, the decision maker knows when to decide, but not what
to decide. To help decision makers resolve their protect/do not protect
dilemmas, Enhanced GDS incorporates into a number of its maps and tables
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the probability forecasts from the National Weather Services Public
Advisory. When interpreting these numbers, it is important to realize that
the probabilities reported are total cumulative probabilities for the forecast
period, analogous to the time-integrated strike probabilities issued by the
U.S. Navy. There is an opportunity for confusion here. Because
probabilities are a measure of forecast error and forecast error increases
with time, it should be expected that the probabilities would be much lower
when the hurricane is three days from landfall than when the hurricane is
only one day from landfall. This is indeed the case; however, since the
probabilities given are cumulative in nature, it may not be readily apparent.
The Users Guide suggests using the probability forecast in the following
way:
...when you have reached a decision point (say, 32 hours
before center's CPA),...compare the probability for the
corresponding time frame to a probability threshold you've
determined in advance. If the current probability is greater
than the threshold value, initiate the response, if not, don't.
Which probability value to use as a threshold is not a technical
matter, it is a matter of your willingness to take risk. Some
people use 30%, some use lower probabilities for stronger
storms, and some use the ratio of their probability to the
highest to ever be expected for a particular time frame.
(Hazards Management Group, Inc., 1990, p. 10)
As another aid to decision makers, Enhanced GDS graphically depicts
the uncertainty in the position forecasts using "probability ellipses." For
example, a 50% ellipse drawn around the 24-hour forecast means that there
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is a 50-50 chance the actual 24-hour position will be somewhere within the
ellipse. The value of this approach is that it keeps the decision maker from
focusing on a point (which is probably wrong) and instead has the decision
maker consider an area where the center of the storm might be. Increasing
the confidence level necessarily increases the size of the ellipse. (Hazards
Management Group, Inc., 1990, p. 11) Another display using ellipses that
a decision maker might find useful shows two concentric ellipses around a
forecast position, where the inside ellipse is the probability ellipse and the
outer ellipse is an isotach for a particular wind speed. The isotach is drawn
by assuming the center of the storm is located somewhere on the periphery
of the probability ellipse. Enhanced GDS will also plot around a forecast
position a "probability grid" which is a 99% probability ellipse divided into
many segments, each with a .5% chance of containing the center of the
storm. (Hazards Management Group, Inc., 1990, p. 12) This spiderweb-like
grid provides the basis for determining strike probabilities, although the
actual calculations and methods are far more complex.
The uncertainty in the intensity (maximum sustained wind speed) of
the hurricane is displayed by Enhanced GDS using a histogram. Starting
with the current wind speed, Enhanced GDS gives the probability (up to
90%) that the winds will not exceed certain speeds. (Hazards Management
Group, Inc., 1990, p. 13)
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2. GDS Bootstrap
According to the Users Guide, the hardest part of decision making is:
".
. . developing a decision system in which the various types of threat
information are integrated and weighed against one another to produce an
overall evaluation indicating an appropriate response." (Hazards
Management Group, Inc., 1990, p. 16) GDS Bootstrap enables the decision
maker to derive a utility function that reflects the decision maker's own
values and preferences regarding hurricane threats. Figure 9 contains a
table of hypothetical hurricane threat information. (Hazards Management
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KOMI 1 65 1 4« 1 300 1 100 1 5 1 5 1 I
WATCH 1 63 24 1 10 1 150 1 25 1 5 1 1
WATCH 1 US 24 10 1 100 1 IS 1 50
WARNING 1 165 1 12 1 100 1 100 1 25 1 20 1
HONE 1 115 1 4i 1 300 1 200 1 25 1 SO i
WATCH 1 165 1 24 1 10 1 200 1 S 1 20 1 1
HOWE 1 165 I 24 100 1 100 IS 1 5 1 1
WAJUriKC 1 65 1 46 1 10 1 ISO 1 15 50 1 i
NONE 1 165 12 10 1 200 1 IS SO 1 i
WATCH 1 65 4« 100 1 200 25 20 1
warning 1 165 24 1 300 1 ISO 23 SO 1 1
WATCH 1 165 4* 1 100 1 100 5 , 50 1 1
WARNTNC 1 115 12 1 100 ISO S SO 1 1
WARNING 1 165 46 i 10 200 1 25 s 1
HOICt 1 65 12 10 ISO 5 20 1
WATCH 165 1 12 1 300 1 ISO 1 5 5 1
WONT 165 1 46 1 300 1 ISO 1 IS 20
WARNING 115 1 41 1 10 1 100 1 5 20
WARNTNC 115 1 24 300 200 5 S i
NONE 115 1 24 1 100 1 150 1 25 20
WATCH 115 1 4« 100 1 ISO IS 5 1 !
NONE 1 65 1 24 100 200 5 .so 1
•
WATCH 1 115 1 12 300 200 15 20
NONE 1 115 1 12 1 10 1 100 25 5 1
WARNING 1 65 1 24 1 300 1 100 15 20
WARNING 1 65 1 12 1 100 1 200 1 IS 5 1
WATCH 1 65 1 12 1 300 1 100 1 25 so 1
Figure 9. Hypothetical Hurricane Threat Information for GDS
Bootstrap, (from Hazards Management Group, Inc., 1990)
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The following are instructions to the decision maker for using GDS
Bootstrap:
In many instances we are unable to articulate precisely
how we make decisions, even if we follow a very consistent
procedure for making them. To get around that obstacle we
ask you to tell us how you believe you would respond to each
of several specially constructed hypothetical hurricane threats.
Although some of the threats are highly unlikely (if possible at
all) they have the statistical property of allowing us to separate
out the weight you place on each of the seven bits of
information and to "capture" the process you used to evaluate
the threats.(Hazards Management Group, Inc., 1990, p. 16)
GDS Bootstrap incorporates the decision maker's responses into a
customized program. Then, during a real hurricane threat, the decision
maker can run Bootstrap and obtain a response value based on the logic
used in responding to the hypothetical threats. The response value can be
related to recommended response actions appropriate to that level of threat.
(Hazards Management Group, Inc., 1990, p. 17)
Without any data, it is difficult to assess whether GDS Bootstrap is
worth the amount of time it would take to evaluate 27 hypothetical threats,
each with seven pieces of information. GDS Bootstrap may be asking too
much of our decision maker.25 This would be a difficult proposition even for
an experienced forecaster (on the other hand, it may actually be harder for
the forecaster to respond to what he knows are impossible scenarios).
"When presented with eight important attributes of risky investments, business
managers focused on only one or two attributes. Cognitive psychologists and artificial
intelligence experts ascribe this to people's limited capability for processing information.
(MacCrimmon and Wehrung, 1986, pp. 138-141)
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Furthermore, the decision maker is given no feedback that the decision
process he is using is consistent, as is assumed. Traditionally, utility curves
are derived through a carefully structured personal interview where the
decision maker is shown his inconsistencies and is allowed to change his
answers to achieve consistency if so desired. Even if the decision maker is
responding consistently to the threats, how will he know he is not
consistently wrong? Finally, it is irrelevant if the decision maker is
optimizing his individual utility curve. What is needed is a utility curve for
the organization, in this case, the U.S. Navy. Efficiency will be achieved
when all of the Navy decision makers adopt the same hurricane response
policy, not when each decision maker acts in accordance with his own
attitudes toward risk.
3. Shiftrack
Shiftrack starts with actual hurricane threats and adapts them to any
selected location. GDS Toolkit provides the decision maker with storm data
files and forecasts for 25 historical Gulf of Mexico and Atlantic hurricanes
(in addition to the files for Allen, Elena, Gloria, and Hugo which come with
Enhanced GDS). The decision maker simply selects a storm from the
archives and specifies where he wants it to hit. Shiftrack automatically
modifies the storm coordinates and forecasts. The result is a new storm file
that can be run with GDS. Working through the storm's development, the
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decision maker can hone his skills by deciding how he would respond to
each advisory. (Hazards Management Group, Inc., 1990, p. 18)
F. CHARM
The Cyclone/Hurricane Acceptable Risk Model (CHARM e , Science
Applications, Inc., 1982) is a dynamic, computer-based hurricane risk
assessment model that uses a historical hurricane track data base, a forecast
error data base, a forecast simulation program and the real-time NHC
current forecast to provide the equivalent experience of "thousands of
forecasters". CHARM translates this experience into strike and wind
probabilities and a product called Earliest Time to Expect (ETE). ETE is
based on a user-selected confidence level and answers the question, "Based
on historical hurricane movement through this geographical area, what is
the minimum time I have until the hurricane hits us?" CHARM can also be
used to predict storm surge and flooding. (Telephone conversation between
Charles Neumann, Science Applications International Corporation and the
author, 7 June 1994)
The next chapter discusses another Science Applications product, the
CHARM model for setting hurricane readiness conditions , which uses much




V. THE CHARM MODEL
A. INTRODUCTION
Sortie decisions in the face of an approaching hurricane are largely
based on the storm forecast track (Brand and Blelloch, 1975, p. 355) and the
likely maximum wind that will be experienced at the location of interest.26
(Kostyshack and Jarrell, 1984, p. 2) Appleman (1962) suggested using wind
probability forecasts as a decision criterion: "It may be that the various
commanders on the base will either have or wish to formulate plans that are
put into operation when the probability of the base being struck by above-
critical wind speeds exceeds a certain value." (Appleman, 1962, p. 22)
Jarrell and Brand (1983) expanded on the role that wind speed plays in the
decision process, theorizing that there exists a destructive wind level (e.g.,
50 kt) for which preparations must be made, and a lower wind level (e.g.,
30 kt) which prohibits most preparations. This became known as the
Cyclone/Hurricane Acceptable Risk Model (CHARM) concept. (Kostyshack
and Jarrell, 1984, p. 2) Unfortunately, standard forecasts only predict wind
speeds of the cyclone and leave it up to the individual decision makers to
interpret how the storm will affect them. Wind probability forecasts pick up
26Actually, the sortie problem is related more to the hurricane's outer wind structure
or size (e.g., 30- and 50-kt wind radii) than to the storm track or intensity.
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where the standard forecasts leave off by quantifying the threat at specific
sites.
The CHARM model uses these wind probabilities to set conditions of
readiness at a user-specified confidence level. The development of the
CHARM model was accomplished through a procedure called SETCON
(Kostyshack and Jarrell, 1984, pp. 5-12) which is outlined in the next
section. The results of the model will be interpreted, followed by a
discussion of the findings and recommendations for refinements and
applications.
B. METHODOLOGY
Kostyshack and Jarrell (1984) were interested in developing a model
based on the CHARM concept that would help to minimize the risks
associated with decision-making based on imprecise forecasts. (Kostyshack
and Jarrell, 1984, p. 1) The procedure was SETCON; the product was a
tactical decision aid for setting hurricane conditions of readiness. In the
original study, CHARM nomographs were introduced for Key West, Florida
and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Key West will be used here to illustrate the
model methodology and features because of a wind probability bias in the
Guantanamo Bay results.
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Using CLIPER27 (Neumann, 1972) and current forecast error
characteristics, procedure SETCON created a large data set of simulated
forecasts (approximately 10,000) for 197 actual hurricanes that passed
within 360 n mi of Key West from 1899-1979. For each hurricane, multiple
independent forecast tracks were generated from the same starting point,
located on the archived storm track 72 hours prior to the storm's closest
point of approach to Key West. Storm position, maximum wind speed and
time-integrated 30- and 50-kt wind probabilities (P30 and P50) for Key West
were forecast for 12, 24, 48 and 72 hours from the initial position.
The actual hurricanes were then "hindcasted" or backcasted to
determine when conditions of readiness should have been set at Key West,
based on the time when hurricane force winds were observed there.
Because the maximum wind experienced at a specific location was not
directly available from the tropical cyclone track archive, it was estimated
from the latitude, storm motion and center wind speed. The following
notation was used to set the tropical cyclone hindcast conditions for Key
West:
HI: winds ( > 64 kt) occurred at Key West within 12 hours;
H2: winds ( > 64 kt) occurred at Key West within 24 hours;
27CLIPER is a regression equation forecasting model which uses predictors derived from
climatology and persistence.
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H3: winds ( > 64 kt) occurred at Key West within 48 hours;
H4: winds ( > 64 kt) occurred at Key West within 72 hours.
Next, the simulated forecasts were compared to these hindsight
estimates of actual conditions. (Kostyshack and Jarrell, 1984, pp. 13-15)
Figure 10 shows the results of these comparisons. Each point plotted on the
CHARM nomograph for Condition II represents the ordered pair of wind
probabilities, (P30 , P50), taken from a forecast of a cyclone that in hindsight
is known to have caused hurricane-force winds at Key West between 12 and
24 hours later (in short, H2 was set). Plots for HI, H3 and H4 were
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Figure 10. CHARM Nomograph Showing the Scatter Plot of (P30 , P50)
Values, (from Kostyshack and Jarrell, 1984)
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The heavy curved line in Figure 10 is the warning condition threshold
that resulted from the user choosing a 95% confidence level. The user's
selection of this confidence level means that the user desired that Condition
II be set in at least 95% of the occasions that warranted it. Ninety-five
percent of the points lie above and to the right of the threshold and indicate
the occasions in which Condition II would be correctly set; the remaining 5%
lying below the curve represent the times when Condition II would not be
set even though hindcast conditions called for it. The derivation of the
family of curves will be covered in the next section.
Thresholds were determined for each condition of readiness and then
combined on a single nomograph, minus the probability plots. Figure 1
1
shows a completed nomograph for Key West.
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Figure 11. Key West Hurricane Readiness Condition Nomograph, (from
Kostyshack and Jarrell, 1984)
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The authors recommended photocopying the nomograph and using
a separate graph to track each hurricane. Wind probability forecasts are
issued every six hours. The graph should be entered with the (P30 , P50)
values from the maximum forecast available (usually the 72-hour forecast)
and should be updated with each new forecast. The zones between the
thresholds represent recommendations as to which condition of readiness
should be set, if any. (Kostyshack and Jarrell, 1984, p. 19)
Figure 12 shows the consecutive forecast wind probabilities from
Table 1 plotted on a CHARM nomograph.
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Figure 12. CHARM Nomograph for
Setting Color-Coded Conditions, (from
Jarrell and Brand, 1983)
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Actual Forecast Forecast Forecast Forecast
(ime to maximum wind CPA P*> P» CHARM
strike (ms'r (km) (%) (%) threat
72 h 15 140 12 22 1.62 green
66 h 25 85 12 19 161 green
60 h 50 12 17 1.61 green
54 h 50 18 24 2.15 yellow
48 h 20 220 23 32 2.42 yellow
42 h 10 250 24 30 2.46 yellow
36 h 10 240 26 34 2.58 yellow
30 h 15 165 33 43 3.01 orange
24 h 25 185 42 52 3.35 orange
18 h 60 93 59 73 4.27 red
12 h 60 75 78 91 4 72 red
6 h 60 35 88 98 4 87 red
Table 1. Comparison of Threat Indices to the
City of Rosseau as Hurricane David Approached
in August 1979. (from Jarrell and Brand, 1983)
In this example, the thresholds represent arbitrary cost-benefit ratios.
Conditions I, II, IE and IV are color-coded as Red, Orange, Yellow and
Green, respectively. The plots correctly show a steady trend of increasing
threat over the three-day period. (Jarrell and Brand, 1983, p. 1056)
C. DERIVATION OF THE CHARM CURVES
The family of curves in the CHARM nomographs were derived from
the cost-loss ratio described in Chapter n. Kostyshack and Jarrell (1984)
refer to it as a Cost-Benefit Ratio (CBR). They maintain that, while the CBR
is a useful decision criterion, it is impossible to determine in advance of a
hurricane and is impossible to estimate directly. SETCON resolves this
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problem by indirectly estimating the CBRs.(Kostyshackand Jarrell, 1984, pp.
2-4) The user selects the confidence level, the confidence level specifies the
threshold curve, and each curve can be related back to the equation from
which it was derived. The following assumptions were made:
1. Thirty-knot winds interrupt preparations, therefore these
preparations must be started sufficiently in advance of 30-kt
winds to allow for their completion.
2. Losses occur with the arrival of 50-kt winds.
3. The fraction of preparations completed is (1 - P30).
4. The fraction of preparations completed will prevent the same
fraction, (1 - P30), of avoidable damage.
5. The decision maker is risk neutral.
The cost matrix associated with this model of the cost-loss ratio
situation is depicted in Figure 13 where the actions are denoted by P (start
to prepare) and P' (do not start to prepare), the states are denoted byW (
>
50 kt winds occur) and W ( < 50 kt winds occur), C is the cost of








Figure 13. CHARM Cost Table, (after
Kostyshack and Jarrell, 1984)
If the decision criterion is to minimize expected losses, the optimal
decision is to protect (set the appropriate condition, start to prepare) if:
P50O - P30XC - L) + (1 - PsoXl - P^C < PsoL
5.1
This simplifies to:
(1 - P30)C < (2 - P3o)P5oL
5.2
or
[(2 - P3o)/(l - P30)P50] > C/L
5.3
Curves in the CHARM nomographs were obtained by setting the cost-
loss ratio (C/L) equal to values from zero to one, assigning P^ to values from
zero to one and solving for Pso, assuming equality for the above relationship.
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Note that it is impossible for P.*, to exceed P30 . (facsimile from Jerry Jarrell,
NHC to the author, 9 June 1994)
D. ANALYSIS
A confidence level of .95 for all four hurricane readiness conditions
was selected for the Key West study. This resulted in CBR values of .78, .17,
.062 and .04 for Conditions I, II, III and IV, respectively. (Kostyshack and
Jarrell, 1984, p. 15) Figure 14 displays the results using simple two-way
contingency tables, where W denotes that hurricane force winds (> 64 kt)
occurred, W denotes that hurricane force winds did not occur, P denotes
that the relevant hindsight condition H
f
(i = 1, 2, 3, 4) was set, and P
denotes that Hj was not set. (Kostyshack and Jarrell, 1984, p. 17) All values
represent frequencies or percentages.
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100.010.8 80.2 3.9 96.1
Figure 14. Results Using CHARM Nomograph for Key West to Set
Hindsight Conditions, (after Kostyshack and Jarrell, 1984)
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The contingency table for Condition IE will be used to illustrate how
easily the results can be interpreted in this format. The probability of
committing a type I error in setting Condition HI (protecting when adverse
weather does not occur) is .621. In this thesis, the probability of this kind
of error is equivalent to the overwarning rate. The probability of a type II
error (failing to protect when it is warranted) is .002. The percentage of
correct calls (37.7%) is obtained by adding the outcomes associated with
combinations (P, W) and (P\ W). Of those cases where hurricane-force
winds subsequently occurred, 98% (10.6 of 10.8) were preceded with wind
probabilities exceeding the lower threshold for setting Condition DDL This
percentage can also be expressed as Pr(P W), or the probability of
protecting, given that we know that adverse weather occurred. These




I II III IV
Type!: Pr(P,W) 41.9% 40.9% 62.1% 32.3%
TypeH: Pr(P',W) 0.0% 0.9% 0.2% 1.5%
Correct call:
Pr(P,W) + Pr(P\W) 58.1% 58.2% 37.7% 66.2%
Correct warning: Pr ( P 1 W ) 100.0% 97.0% 98.0% 62.0%
Table 2. Summary of Results Using CHARM Nomograph for Key West to
Set Hindsight Conditions, (after Kostyshack and Jarrell, 1984)
In the original study, Kostyshack and Jarrell (1984) analyzed the data
in terms of the timing of the action taken. The condition could be set
"early," "on time," or "late." These categories were translated into the P and
P used in Figure 14 by interpreting those cases labeled "early" and "on time"
as occasions where the condition was set, and "late" as meaning the
condition was not set (though eventually some condition was set in every
case). Also, since the tropical cyclones were only analyzed up to 72 hours
before passing Key West, it was not possible to set Condition IV early.
(Kostyshack and Jarrell, 1984, p. 16)
The data were also examined from the viewpoint that the action taken
could be "too strong" (overwarning), "correct", or "too weak' (underwarning).
The term "overwarning" may lead to some confusion. The authors
inadvertently used overwarning to describe all cases where adverse weather
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did not occur. In this thesis, overwarning refers to all cases where the
condition was set unnecessarily (a type I error). This difference in meaning
led Kostyshack and Jarrell to report overwarning rates of 41.9%, 74.0%,
89.2%, and 96.1% for Conditions I, n, IE, and IV, respectively, whereas this
author finds the overwarning rates to be much lower 41.9%, 40.9%, 62.1%,
and 32.3%. (Kostyshack and Jarrell, 1984, pp. 16-17)
Kostyshack and Jarrell used the overwarning rate in another measure
of effectiveness, the ratio of overwarnings to correct warnings. This ratio
was calculated by dividing the percentage of cases where adverse weather
did not occur by the percentage of cases where adverse weather did occur.
The ratios that were reported (before rounding) were .721, 2.846, 8.259, and
24.24 for conditions I, II, m, and IV, respectively. Using this thesis'
definition of overwarning, the ratios of overwarnings to correct warnings or
Pr(P, W) / Pr(P | W) become: .419, .422, .634, and .521. (Kostyshack and
Jarrell, 1984, pp. 16-17)
E. DISCUSSION
The CHARM model takes the cost-loss models of Chapter HI a few
steps further. This section will comment upon CHARM'S assumptions and
address some of the merits and drawbacks of the model.
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1. Assumptions
a, 30-Knot Winds Interrupt Preparations
If the decision is whether or not to sortie an aircraft carrier,
then a lower wind speed should be used as the criterion. The maximum
wind speed for moving a carrier is 20 knots (NAVLANTMETOCCEN Norfolk
"Hurricane Emily Sortie" brief, 1 994) . FNMOC's Strike and Wind Probability
software can be modified to provide wind probabilities for other than 30 and
50 knots.
b. Losses Occur with the Arrival of50-Knot Winds
Of course, losses do occur at much lower wind speeds. From
January 1969 to July 1994, there were 131 incidents reported Navy-wide of
ship damage or personnel injuries caused by "heavy weather" and incurred
while the ship was either moored or anchored (Commander, Naval Safety
Center Letter, 20 July 1994). Sea state was implicated in the vast majority
of the brief narratives. Although "high winds" were mentioned in many of
the narratives and could be inferred from others, specific wind speeds were
given in only 21 of the 131 incident reports. Winds speeds ranged from 10
kt to "well over 100 kt", with the central tendencies at 40 kt and a standard
deviation of 22.2 kt. Most of the incidents occurred during the winter
months (outside of hurricane season) . Only three of the narratives indicated
that the damages were caused by tropical cyclones. The maximum
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sustained wind speeds for these storms were 100+ kt, 50 kt, and 65 kt.
Considering only this last set, albeit small, 50 knots is a reasonable lower
bound.
c. The Fraction ofPreparations Completed is (1 - PJ0)
This is a legitimate enhancement of the basic cost-loss model
and a direct result of the CHARM concept. Preparation costs, then, can be
considered time-dependent, by virtue of the fact that the probability of 30-kt
winds is an increasing function of time in the domain in which the decision
maker is acting, i.e., during the approach of the cyclone.
d. TheFraction ofPreparations Completed WillPrevent the
Same Fraction, (1 - P#), ofAvoidable Damage
In other words, if $2 of protection successfully avoids $100 in
damages, then half that amount of protection will avoid $50 in damages.
e. The Decision Maker is Risk-Neutral
This implies a linear utility function for costs (see discussion on
utilities in Chapter II). It is this assumption that allows us to take straight
expected values to find the optimal decision in our "game against nature."
There are several reasons why minimizing expected costs may not be a good
decision criterion:
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1. According to Winkler and Murphy (1985), linear utility is often
thought to be a reasonable assumption only when the payoffs
(positive or negative) are small (Winkler and Murphy, 1985, p.
507). The costs in this case may be quite large.
2. There is a growing body of research in support of risk-seeking
behavior when offered no chance of gain (Slovic et al., 1977;
Kunreuther, 1979; Schoemaker and Kunreuther, 1979; Kahneman
andTversky, 1979; MacCrimmon and Wehrung, 1986; and others).
This contradicts the risk-aversion for losses espoused by expected
utility theory (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947) and
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
3. Decision makers are probably not computing expected values to
choose the optimal course of action. Schoemaker (1979)
found that, unless statistically trained, individuals employed
additive information-processing strategies, not multiplicative
(Schoemaker, 1979, p. 128). Simon (1979) questioned the
adequacy of rational choice theory, referring to "the grotesquely
powerful intellectual capacities which are supposedly called upon
for every choice." (Douglas, 1985, p. 74) Douglas (1985)
maintained that people do not consistently make the optimal
choice even though there is reason to believe that this is their goal
(Douglas, 1985, p. 99). Finally, in a review of empirical studies of
behavioral responses to major hazards, Hedge (1987) concluded
that a person's behavior was "only loosely connected with any
probabilistic risk judgement." (Singleton and Hovden, 1987, p.
151)
4. Decision makers have no incentives for taking risks and would do
just as well to employ a conservative nonprobabilistic
decision criterion such as the ones described in Chapter II
.
According to Demsetz, in light of the severe damage that
hurricanes can cause "... it seems reasonable to assume that many
decision makers prefer to follow a minimax strategy rather than
one that seeks to rriinimize the expected cost." (Demsetz, 1962, p.
10) Lopes (1981) asserted: "...in the real world individuals cannot
expect to play any game through the long run of probabilities.
Long run arguments should not be applied to decisions about
short-run outcomes." (Douglas, 1985, p. 100) Swalm (1971) found
that many decision makers preferred not to recommend wise risks
to their companies, even though theywere aware that their refusal
to recommend such action was not in the interests of their
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company. The reasoning these businessmen used was ". . . half of
the time they would have to explain a $20,000 'mistake,' and if this
happened too often they might not be around to share the gains
the company would, in the long run, make." (American Society
for Engineering Education, 1980, p. 25)
There are also a number of arguments in favor of assuming linear
utility for costs:
1. One seldom loses much with a linear model. According to L. J.
Savage, "All functions are constant, except for a few that are
linear." (American Society for Engineering Education, 1980, p.
125) The same assumption was made by Thompson (1952, 1962),
Thompson and Brier (1955), Nelson and Winter (1960), Anderson
(1973), Anderson and Burnham (1973), Murphy (1977), and
Murphy and Ye (1990).
2. Although utility functions have been derived for individual
decision makers (Grayson, 1960), little research has been
done on developing a utility curve for an organization.
3. MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1986) reported that, when presented
with several important attributes of a risky venture,
managers focused most strongly on the average payoff, or
expected return (MacCrimmon and Wehrung, 1986, p. 173).
2. The Model
The CHARM model differs from the basic cost-loss ratio model in that
the consequence of preparing is not the cost of protection, whether or not
adverse weather is experienced. Using the logic of the CHARM concept, the
decision maker is faced with the following scenario: If P^ is low, then
nearly all of the preparations will be completed before the arrival of 30-kt
winds, therefore the cost of the preparations will be high. These protective
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measures, however, will avoid an amount of losses proportional to the
amount of preparations completed, therefore the cost of damages will be
low. If P30 is high, then not much time is left for preparations. Granted, the
cost of protection will be low, but almost none of the losses will be averted
and the cost of damages will be high.
Kostyshack and Jarrell (1984) used the cost matrix in Figure 13 to
define their model of the situation described above. However, the matrix and
its optimal solution were not included in their published work. Although the
rationale for using the cost-benefit ratio as a decision criterion was given in
the paper, the connection between the CBR and the curves in the CHARM
model was never made. Jerry Jarrell, now the assistant director of the
National Hurricane Center, outlined the model in a facsimile sent to this
author three days after their interview on 6 June 1 994. Further clarifications
(telephone conversation between Jerry Jarrell and the author, 16 August
1994) revealed the following insights into the model (refer to Figure 13, p.
77):
a. Given that < C < L, the result of protecting when adverse
weather occurs, (1 - P30)(C - L), is a negative quantity, thus representing a
savings. Jarrell called this cell "the money-maker", because it is the only
time when the benefits outweigh the costs and the decision maker comes out
ahead. In this case, protecting can be considered a wise investment. The
costs of making a "wrong" decision (protecting when adverse weather does
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not occur or not protecting when adverse weather does occur) are (1 - P30)C
and L, respectively. These "bad investments" show up as positive quantities
or losses in the cost table. The result for (P, W) is zero; the decision maker
neither profits nor loses from the decision not to act.
b. The model does not take into account unavoidable damage.
The variable L is defined as the cost of the avoidable damage, not the cost
of total damages suffered. This sheds some light on the elusive upper left-
hand cell. Even if the result (1 - P30) (C - L) is a negative cost (and therefore
a positive payoff), there may still be negative consequences in the form of
unavoidable damages that are not reflected in the payoff. This also explains
how the cost incurred when the decision is made to protect is less when
adverse weather is experienced than when it is not. By assumption, when
less than 50-kt winds are experienced, there is no damage, avoidable or
unavoidable.
c. Focusing again on the result in the upper left-hand cell, (1 -
P30)(C - L), the savings are lower when the probability of 30-kt winds, P30 ,
is high than when P30 is low. This result is intuitive and follows from the
assumption that C < L.
d. The model is not denned for all values of P30 . The left-hand
side of equation 5.3 is meaningless for PM = 1. This is not a fatal flaw. The
model is no longer needed as a decision aid if P30 = 100%; by assumption,
the only realistic course of action after the arrival of 30-kt winds is to take
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shelter and ride out the storm, actions in keeping with the setting of
Condition I (Jarrell and Brand, 1983, p. 1055). At the other endpoint, P30 =
0, thus P50 = and L = 0. If the decision is to protect (however unlikely),
the result is C regardless of whether one uses the expression (1 - P30) (C - L)
or (1 - P^C. In this case, the decision maker is able to flow between cells
of the matrix without encountering inconsistencies. Likewise, if the decision
is made to not protect, the cost is zero regardless of whether one looks at
the result of (P, W) or (P, W). A problem arises when C = L, resulting in
a zero payoff for (P, W). A zero in the upper left-hand cell for (P, W) does
not have the same meaning as a zero in the lower right-hand cell for (P, W).
In the former case, there is the hidden cost of unavoidable damage that is
not accounted for by the model, yet is certainly experienced by the decision
maker.
3. Other Models
Anderson and Burnham (1973) adapted the basic cost-loss model to
include the concept of unavoidable damage. Their "hurricane game box" is
shown in Figure 15 where A denotes action taken, A, no action taken, H
denotes hurricane, H', no hurricane, C is the cost of protection, L is loss due
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Figure 15. Anderson/Burnham General Model, (after
Anderson and Burnham, 1973)
The optimal decision for this scenario is to take action if P > [C / (1 - a)L],
where P is the probability of a hurricane striking the area at any given time
(the climatological probability). (Anderson and Burnham, 1973, p. 128)
The Anderson/Burnham formulation is appealing in that it is simple,
internally consistent and deterministic. C, L and a are constants, all the
costs are greater than or equal to zero, and all the losses due to hurricane
damage are represented. In this model, the result of taking action when
adverse weather occurs is the cost of protection plus the loss that cannot be
avoided, whereas in the CHARM model, the result is the cost of preparations
completed minus the loss that can be avoided.
Demsetz (1962) also chose an additive approach for computing
hurricane costs when preventive measures are taken. He made the point
that an increase (decrease) in protective measures will be offset in part by
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a decrease (increase) in the costs of damage, so that the sum of protection
costs and damage costs will be more stable than either cost by itself.
(Demsetz, 1962, p. 10)
Although the inclusion of unavoidable losses in the CHARM model
might make it a better representation of reality, it is important to recognize
that unavoidable losses are unaffected by the action taken by the decision
maker and are, therefore, unnecessary in a prescriptive model like CHARM.
4. Further Considerations
a. Risk
Although the use of a linear model does not take into account
the decision maker's attitude toward risk (unless he is indeed risk neutral),
the essence of risk is captured by the model in the user-selected confidence
level. The 95% confidence level used in the original study (Kostyshack and
Jarrell, 1984) is a very risk-averse choice and led to fairly high probabilities
of committing type I errors in setting conditions of readiness. It is neither
necessary nor recommended to use the same confidence level for all four
conditions. The extent of the threat and the cost of the preparations
associated with setting the condition should drive the selection of a
confidence level. The mission of the organization will also influence the
choice. During peacetime, the Navy's overriding concern is to protect the
fleet. Contrast this with the plight of a major oil company based in the Gulf
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of Mexico which loses approximately $1 million a day if it shuts down
operations. The Navy can afford to interrupt business as usual in order to
safeguard its ships and therefore, can afford to make decisions with higher
levels of confidence. In JarreU's opinion (telephone conversation between
Jerry Jarrell, NHC and the author, 16 August 1994), the oil company might
want to select a level around 75% for the evacuation of their oil rigs,
whereas the Navy may go as low as 2-5% for setting Condition IV (a
"freebie") and as high as 95% for setting Condition I. Although Brand and
Blelloch (1975) used 50% as the level of confidence for sortie decisions in
the western North Pacific, confidence levels of 70, 80, or 90 percent were
discussed as perhaps more reasonable alternatives. (Brand and Blelloch,
1975, p. 358) According to Jarrell, the CHARM model was run using almost
every confidence level, however, only the results for 95% were reported.
b. Sequential Decision Making
In a RAND study on the value of weather information, Nelson
and Winter (1960) concluded that "storm warnings must be studied within
a sequential decision framework" and formally state the general structure of
the hurricane protection problem as a guide for future research. As
discussed in Chapter I, forecast reliability increases as the forecast period
decreases, but if the decision maker waits for more accurate forecasts, he
may forgo opportunities for taking protective action or incur the higher cost
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of taking such measures in a shorter period of time if the storm continues
to threaten. (Nelson and Winter, 1960, pp. 105-106) Murphy and Ye (1990)
tackle the formidable problem of implementing a time-dependent version of
the cost-loss ratio situation, using exponential models for forecast accuracy
and protection costs (Murphy and Ye, 1990, p. 947).
The CHARM model, by design, accommodates the principles of
sequential decision making in that it aids decision makers in the setting of
readiness conditions. Readiness conditions tailor the response to meet the
degree of threat by breaking up the response into four sequential decisions
where each decision represents an increasing level of commitment of
resources.
c. ModelApplications and Refinements
The CHARM model can be applied to the sortie decision by
tying the timing of the decision into the setting of readiness conditions. For
example, the local destructive weather plan for Norfolk, Virginia links the
ship protection activities to the hurricane readiness conditions set by the
shore establishment. At Condition IV, the following actions are
recommended: consider a general personnel recall; coordinate sequence of
sortie; publish order/interval of sortie, anchorage assignments and berthing
plans for ships remaining in port; publish estimated time of sortie for
planning purposes; ships not able to get underway release message to chain
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of command; cancel or complete weapons transfers; ships prepare to get
underway with at least half ship's power in 24 hours; and disconnect all
services to ships. At Condition EL if storm movement/strength dictates,
issue order to sortie with time of execution; ships prepare to get underway
on short notice; ships prepare to sail in heavy seas; and for ships remaining
in port, put out additional mooring lines, drop anchors underfoot, and tie
down all loose gear. At Condition It unnest ships in port and conduct
berthing shifts. At Condition L* secure all boating; minimize exposure of
personnel to foul weather; issue general damage assessment messages to
sortied units to keep them informed about general conditions in the port;
and issue return to port order. (COMNAVBASENORVA/SOPA (ADMIN)
HAMPINST 3141. IS, 18 May 1993, Enclosure (1), pp. 2-8)
A full sortie out of Norfolk, Virginia requires 36 hours
(COMNAVBASENORVA/SOPA(ADMIN) HAMPTONINST 3141.1S, 1993).
In order to complete preparations prior to the arrival of 30-kt winds, the
decision to sortie must be made soon after the setting of Condition HI and
executed before the setting of Condition n. In some cases, the sortie
decision may coincide with the National Hurricane Center's issuance of a
Hurricane Watch which occurs approximately 36 hours before landfall.
(Turpin and Brand, 1982, p. 1-12) Allowances should be made for the
inevitable delays from recommendation to decision to action.
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The Navy's wind probability model presumes that the winds are
over water, not land. For harbors such as Guantanamo Bay, Cuba where the
terrain provides substantial shelter from destructive winds, wind
probabilities will be overestimated and cause a bias in the CHARM model
results. (Kostyshack and Jarrell, 1984, p. 22) Jarrell (1982) describes a
method for adjusting wind probabilities for terrain influence. These
adjusted probabilities should be developed and used to produce more
accurate readiness condition thresholds for those bases where terrain is a
factor (Jarrell, 1982, p. 14).
Chapter VI discusses Atlantic tropical cyclone forecast errors as
well as the accuracy of probability forecasts.
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VL TROPICAL CYCLONE FORECAST ERRORS
A. TROPICAL CYCLONE FORECASTING
Despite technological advances, tropical cyclone forecasting remains
a subjective process that is heavily reliant on forecaster skill and experience.
Although aircraft reconnaissance, radar, buoys and satellites have improved
the detection and monitoring of tropical cyclones, they cannot provide the
three-dimensional data required for hurricane track forecasting. Computer
models often predict very different tracks for the same storm. It is
important that decision makers be made aware of the current limitations in
forecast accuracy. (American Meteorological Society, 1993, p. 1379)
B. ATTANTIC TROPICAL CYCLONE FORECAST ERRORS
Forecasters are better at predicting some characteristics of the
hurricane than others. Using a combination of climatology and persistence
as a basis for comparison, the following is the order of skill for forecast
elements (highest skill first): track (or path) forecast, translation speed
forecast, maximum winds forecast and size forecast. The first two elements
are nearly equal in skill, with only a slight preference for track. There is a
sizeable gap between the skill associated with track and speed forecasts and
the skill in forecasting maximum winds. A comparable gap separates winds
and size. Track forecast skill has been shown to exist out to 72 hours, with
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the 48-hour forecast showing the highest level of skill. (American
Meteorological Society, 1993, p. 1379)
The degree of difficulty in accurately forecasting hurricanes is
manifest in the errors associated with the forecasts. The average official
NHC tropical cyclone track forecast errors for the decade 1982-1991 were
54, 104, 206, and 309 n mi for the 12-, 24-, 48-, and 72-h forecasts,
respectively (Lawrence and Gross, 1993). The average official NHC tropical
cyclone maximum wind speed forecast errors for 1982-1991 were 8.0, 11.5,
16.0, and 19.5 kt for the 12-, 24-, 48-, and 72-h forecasts, respectively.
(Minutes of the 47th Interdepartmental Hurricane Conference, 23-26
February 1993, p. B-16) According to the American Meteorological Society's
policy statement on hurricane detection, tracking and forecasting,
these [average wind speed] errors are deceptively low,
however, since they are heavily weighted toward the average
condition where intensity changes are gradual and persistence
forecasts work well. They do not reflect the occasional large
misses that can occur with rapid strengthening or weakening
of a storm. (American Meteorological Society, 1993, p. 1379)
Appleman (1962) recognized that the forecast error values in the
Atlantic-Caribbean area had a latitudinal variation similar to that in the
Pacific, with smaller errors in the south and larger in the north (Appleman,
1962, p. 4). Neumann and Pelissier (1981) found that the Atlantic tropical
cyclone forecast errors for 1970-1979 were correlated with the initial latitude
of the storm. Excessive errors were mainly confined to the region north of
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24.5 degrees N. These errors typically arose in situations where the storm
was forecast to recurve and did not, or was forecast to not recurve and did.
(Neumann and Pelissier, 1981, pp. 1248-1249) Figure 16 shows the
geographical variation in the average 48-hourtropical cyclone forecast error.
(Neumann and Pelissier, 1981, p. 1262) The American Meteorological
Society reported that the track forecast errors were up to 30% greater than
the mean in the central Atlantic region, and up to 30% less than the mean
in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean. These variations were attributed
to different characteristics of hurricane motion in the southern regions as
well as better meteorological data availability due to the greater number of
observation sites in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean. (American








Figure 16. 48-Hour Mean Forecast Errors, (from Neumann and Pelissier,
1981)
A north-south dichotomy can also be seen in landfall forecast errors,
that is, errors in the prediction of the point where a hurricane is expected
to cross a coastline. Neumann and Pelissier (1981) explained:
The magnitude of the landfall error is sensitive to the
orientation of the storm track relative to the segment of
coastline the storm approaches. If a storm approaches normal
to a coastline, a small directional forecast error results in a
small landfall error, whereas, if the angle of approach is small,
a small directional error can result in a large landfall error ....
the former situation usually occurs around the Gulf of Mexico,
and the latter frequently prevails along the Atlantic Coast.
(Neumann and Pelissier, 1981, p. 1264)
The average landfall error for 1970-1979 was only 39 n mi, with a median
of 31.5 n mi. (Neumann and Pelissier, 1981, p. 1264)
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C. IMPROVEMENTS IN FORECASTING
Neumann and Pelissier (1981) suggested that the ability to forecast
hurricane motion had been on a plateau since about 1970.(Neumann and
Pelissier, 1981, p. 1265) The belief that no appreciable improvements have
been made in forecasting in quite some time is still held by some. (Interview
between Charlie Mauck, FNMOC, Monterey and the author, 13 May 1994)
A recent study showed this is not the case. McAdie and Lawrence (1993)
analyzed the official NHC tropical cyclone track forecast errors in the
Atlantic basin from 1970-1991. After adjusting for forecast difficulty, they
found that the errors decreased by an average of .7% per year at 24 hours,
by 1.0% per year for the 48-hour forecast, and by 1.2% per year for the 72-
hour forecast, indicating a significant long-term downward trend. In other
words, the 24-, 48-, and 72-hour track forecast errors have declined 14%,
20%, and 24%, respectively, over the past 20 years. (Minutes of the 47th
Interdepartmental Hurricane Conference, 23-26 February 1993, p. A-77)
Improvements of this magnitude could translate into considerable
savings to the U.S. Navy. Recall from Chapter III that Brand and Blelloch
(1975) estimated that a 20% improvement in the 48-hour forecast error
would mean an annual savings of $292,500 in 1975 dollars for eight western
North Pacific installations. Based on this estimate, the potential savings to
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the sampled bases in 1993 dollars from the 20% decrease in the 48-hour
forecast error reported by McAdie and Lawrence (1993) is $785,6 18.28
Additional improvements in forecast errors may be forthcoming.
Prior to 1992, NHC classified a forecast into one of three categories based
on its degree of difficulty: "hard", "easy," and "all others" (Interview between
Jerry Jarrell, NHC and the author, 6 June 1994). Within each category, the
forecast errors were assumed to follow a bivariate normal distribution with
known mean, standard deviation, and correlation coefficient for each class
(Kostyshack and Jarrell, 1984, p. 6). Today, NHC uses 40 past forecasts,
matched by year, month, latitude and longitude, to derive a distribution for
the current forecast. According to Jarrell, the result is a flatter, wider
distribution that produces greater discrimination and higher probabilities
(Interview between Jerry Jarrell, NHC and the author, 6 June 1994).
The U.S. Navy Strike and Wind Probability Forecast software relies
on forecast errors to derive probability forecasts. Unfortunately, the forecast
errors have not been updated since the program's inception 17 years ago
(Interview between Charlie Mauck, FNMOC, Monterey and the author, 13
May 1994). Consequently, the probability forecasts do not reflect the
improvements in the official NHC forecasts over the past two decades. In
^The U.S. City Average All Items Consumer Price Index (CPI) for all urban consumers
for 1975 is 53.8 and for 1993 is 144.5 (U.S. Bureau of Labor and Statistics, Washington,
D.C., 7 September 1994. Telephone (202) 606-7000). To convert to 1993 dollars:
144.5/53.8 = 2.6859 (multiplication factor applied to 1975 dollar amounts).
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light of the savings shown by Brand and Blelloch (1975), a modification
in
the software is indicated.
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VH. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
This thesis analyzed one aspect of the "hurricane problem" within the
framework of the cost-loss ratio situation. The question of whether or not
to sortie U.S. Navy ships to avoid a hurricane threat was explored using
decision analysis. Particular attention was given to the use of probability
forecasting in decision making. Reducing the number of unnecessary sorties
without putting the fleet at significantly increased risk was identified as a
goal. Analysis included interviews with several prominent tropical cyclone
experts, an exhaustive literature review and a critique of the available
hurricane decision aids.
A number of conclusions can be drawn from this study:
1. The long lead time needed to complete a full sortie requires the
decision maker to rely on forecasts that may contain large errors.
2. Although the cost-loss ratio is a useful criterion for hurricane
sortie decisions, the huge variations in the costs associated with
hurricane preparations and avoidable damages make the cost-loss
ratio a difficult quantity to estimate directly.
3. Forecasts used in conjunction with the port studies in the
Hurricane Havens Handbook for the North Atlantic Ocean and local
destructive weather instructions provide the Navy decision maker
with the data needed to make an informed decision; however, he may
have difficulty integrating all of the information without the assistance
of a decision aid. There are a number of excellent commercial
hurricane decision aids (i.e., GDS and CHARM) that can help the
decision maker visualize and quickly assess the threat.
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4. The ability to incorporate probability forecasts into the analysis is
essential. The wind probability forecast is especially useful in that it
simultaneously accounts for the errors in all aspects of the hurricane
threat.
5. The cost-loss based CHARM model is a simple, reliable tool that
can be applied to preparation decisions regarding ship sorties and the
setting of hurricane readiness conditions.
6. The National Hurricane Center official track forecast errors have
been steadily decreasing over the past twenty years.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on these findings and the research conducted, the following
recommendations are made:
1. The CHARM methodology described in Kostyshack and Jarrell
(1984) should be used to develop CHARM nomographs for harbors
used by the U.S. Navy fleet. NHC's current method for estimating
forecast errors should be used to generate the simulated forecasts.
CHARM nomographs should be included in the Hurricane Havens
Handbook port studies.
2. The U.S. Navy Strike and Wind Probability software should be
updated to reflect the current NHC official forecast errors. Terrain
adjustments should be applied to the wind probabilities where needed.
The National Hurricane Center is willing to provide FNMOC with any
assistance necessary. (Interview between Jerry Jarrell, NHC and the
author, 6 June 1994)
3. Probability forecasts should be incorporated into ATCFjr.
4. Navy decision makers and forecasters should use Shiftrack from
GDS Toolkit to practice responding to hurricane threats. Shiftrack
should also be used to train Base Hurricane Preparedness Officers.
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5. A concerted effort should be made to educate Navy decision
makers regarding the proper interpretation and use of probability
forecasts.
C. FUTURE RESEARCH
Several areas for future research are identified. In the past,
inadequate tropical cyclone record-keeping by hurricane preparedness
officers prevented a number of researchers from successfully "backcasting"
the readiness conditions set at sampled installations. Automated hurricane
tracking programs in use today may improve the local tropical cyclone
archives and allow for a more precise accounting of overwarning rates.
At the 48th Interdepartmental Hurricane Conference, the
NAVLANTMETOCCEN Norfolk requested in their Hurricane Emily Sortie
brief that the NHC extend their forecasts out to 96 hours. Ship routing often
requires forecasting for more than three days. The NHC track forecasts
currently show skill out to 72 hours; beyond that, climatology is the only
objective guidance available. The global forecast models at FNMOC and
other centers now produce track forecasts out to 120 hours once the storm
has reached 35-kt intensity. Although many of these forecasts cannot be
verified because the storm does not persist for another five days, limited
statistics suggest some skill for many "well-behaved" storms. Continued
research in the area of longer-range tropical cyclone forecasting would be
beneficial.
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Once a CHARM nomograph for Norfolk, Virginia has been developed,
the CHARM model should be applied to the Norfolk case study on the
Hurricane Emily Sortie. This was an extremely difficult determination for
Navy decision makers because the storm came so close to Norfolk before
turning away. Also, sensitivity analysis of the CHARM model results should
be conducted in order to see how the cost-benefit ratio and type I and type
II errors are affected when different confidence levels are used.
Future study should be devoted to improving the sortie process.
Possible research questions might be "Where are the bottlenecks?" and "How
much effect will an additional tug have on the time needed to sortie?" The
shorter the required lead time, the more accurate the forecasts will be.
One aspect of hurricane threat assessment that the decision aids
(except for the local destructive weather instruction) did not factor into their
analysis was the timing of decisions with regard to the number of daylight
hours remaining. For example, it does little good to issue a warning, set the
next higher condition of readiness, or order a sortie after everyone has
retired for the night. A night sortie is highly undesirable; darkness adds to
the difficulty of the sortie and greatly increases the possibility of ships
colliding (Minutes of the 47th Interdepartmental Hurricane Conference, 23-
26 February 1993, p. B-81).
Finally, an in-depth analysis of tropical cyclone size (wind
distribution) forecast errors similar to Neumann and Pelissier (1981) is
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needed. Currently, only track and maximum wind speed forecast errors are
published. Although it is commonly assumed that an intensity (maximum
wind speed) increase will be accompanied by a size increase, recent
research indicates that this assumption does not always hold. Identification
of statistically significant biases or trends in the official forecasts is the first
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